Law Information: generallaw fia elctreic

Detection of Electricity Bill
ڈی ٹیکشن بل ۔۔۔ بجلی چوری ۔۔۔ الیکٹرک انسپکٹر کو اختیار نہیں کہ وہ تنازعہ کو تصفیہ کرے بلکہ یہ دیوانی عدالت کا بلاشرکت غیرے اختیار ہے کہ وہ مناسب شہادت قلمبندکرکے فیصلہ صادرکرے ۔۔۔۔-----------------------------
in case of theft of electricity or illegal abstraction of energy, Electric Inspector had no jurisdiction to adjudicate a dispute and jurisdiction was exclusively with civil court, which could resolve the controversy after proper appreciation of evidence produced by parties
----------2016 CLC Note 39 Peshawar

FIA is not competent to register an FIR for a dispute between two private individuals.
2016 SCMR 44
Partial partition is not allowable...................
. 2016 YLR Peshawar 1489 (B)
bail for the offence 365-b allowed
2015 YLR 1777 PESHAWAR FARMAN ALI FAZAL RABI
S.497(2)---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S.365-b ---Kidnaping a woman to compel her for marriage---bail , grant of---Absondence of accused---Effect---Accused was arrested after recovery of abductee who alleged him for kidnaping her and illegally confining her---Validity---Two main components and ingredients of offence: Firstly there must be kidnaping or abduction of a woman and secondly the first act of abduction and kidnaping was with intent that she could be compelled to marriage or be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse---All such elements were missing against accused---Long abscondance of accused by itself was no ground for refusal of bail , when otherwise case for bail was made out on merits---Though offence was heinous in nature but mere fact that accused was charged for a heinous offence would not hamper in the way of bail , if otherwise, he had made out a case of bail on merits---Accused despite remaining in police custody made no confession before competent Court nor abductee had been recovered by local police from his possession, which had made case of accused one of further inquiry---bail was allowed in circumstances.
2014 MLD 473 LAHORE SHAMAS DIN State
S.497(2)---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S.365-b ---Kidnapping woman to compel for marriage---bail , grant of---Divergent stance of alleged abductee---Case of further inquiry---Three statements of alleged abductee were on the record which were contradictory to one another---Effect---Alleged abductee had taken divergent stands at different forums and the same had prima facie created serious doubt in prosecution story mentioned in F.I.R. and benefit of such doubt was to go in favour of accused---High Court expressed with concern that it had become routine that when girl/abductee joined her parents she took summersault from her earlier stance---Mere heinousness of offence was not a ground to refuse bail to an accused person who otherwise was entitled for the same relief---Case against accused called for further inquiry into his guilt within the purview of S.497(2), Cr.P.C.---bail was allowed in circumstances.
2013 YLR 703 QUETTA MUHAMMAD AMIN State
S. 497---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss.365-b /452/ 496-A/ 147/ 148/ 149---Kid-napping, abducting or inducing woman to compel for marriage etc., enticing or taking away or detaining with criminal intent a woman, rioting, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly---bail , grant of---No case of abduction was made out---Effect---Allegation against accused persons was that they came to complainant's house while armed with weapons and forcibly abducted his sister/alleged abductee---Alleged abductee recorded her statement before the Magistrate to the effect that she left her house with her own consent and free-will and contracted marriage with one of the accused---Trial Court rejected bail application of accused persons on the grounds that alleged abductee was still in their custody; that her Nikah was disputed and she had not been recovered, and that offence alleged fell within the prohibitory clause of S. 497, Cr.P.C.---Validity---Alleged abductee recorded her statement on oath before the Magistrate, wherein she stated that she had voluntarily gone with one of the accused and contracted valid marriage with him of her own choice---Alleged abductee negated the allegations levelled in the F.I.R.---Magistrate allowed alleged abductee to go with her husband after recording her statement---No case of abduction was made out against accused persons and they were admitted to bail accordingly.
2013 YLR 2648 LAHORE Mrs. SARDARAN BIBI State
S. 498---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S.365-b ---Kidnapping, abducting or inducing woman to compel for marriage, etc.---bail , before arrest, grant of---Delay of one month and twenty-eight days in registration of the F.I.R., had not been explained by the complainant---Alleged abductee in her statement recorded under S.161, Cr.P.C., had refuted the allegations mentioned in the F.I.R.; and had stated that she had contracted marriage with the accused, of her own free will and volition; and that nobody had abducted her---Even in her statement recorded under S.164, Cr.P.C. by the Special Judicial Magistrate, alleged abductee had refuted her abduction and affirmed factum of her Nikkah with accused---Complainant seemed to have spreaded net wide, just to entangle the whole family of accused in the case---Accused persons, who were previous non-convict, were never involved in any criminal case---Accused persons, having already joined the investigation, sending them behind the bars, would not serve any beneficial purpose---False implication of accused, could not be ruled out of consideration, in circumstances---Ad interim pre-arrest bail already allowed to accused persons, was confirmed, in circumstances.
2013 YLR 201 LAHORE SAIFULLAH alias GAPPOO State
Ss. 498 & 497(2)---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 365-b /376/420/468/471/496-A/ 458/494/495---West Pakistan Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964), S.5 & Sched.--Kidnapping, abducting or inducing woman to compel for marriage etc., rape, cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property, forgery for purpose of cheating, using as genuine a forged document, enticing or taking away or detaining with criminal intent a woman, lurking house-trespass or house-breaking by night after preparation for hurt, assault or wrongful restraint, marrying again during life time of husband or wife, concealment of former marriage from person with whom subsequent marriage is contracted---Ad interim pre-arrest bail , confirmation of---Further inquiry---Nikah Nama in favour of accused---Divergent stances taken by alleged abductee---Suit for jactitation of marriage pending in Family Court---Effect---Accused was alleged to have abducted the abductee and contracted marriage with her, when allegedly she was already married to another person---Net was spread wide by complainant to entangle whole family of the accused in the case---Registered Nikah Nama of alleged abductee was available on record which established her marriage with accused---Nikah of alleged abductee with another person as claimed by complainant side was not available on police file---Suit for jactitation of marriage was pending in the Family Court and matters involving Nikah between parties should be resolved by Family Court and not by police---Alleged abductee had taken different stances at different forums during investigation, at times in support of accused and at against him, which itself created doubt in the prosecution story and made the case one of further inquiry---Ad interim pre-arrest bail already allowed to accused was confirmed in circumstances.
2013 PCrLJ 1424 KARACHI-HIGH-COURT-SINDH ALI MURTAZA State
S. 498--- Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 365-b , 496-A, 457, 392 & 34---Kidnapping, abducting or inducing woman to compel for marriage etc., enticing or taking away or detaining with criminal intent a woman, lurking house-trespass or house-breaking by night in order to commit offence punishable with imprisonment, robbery, common intention---Pre-arrest bail , confirmation of---Accused persons had allegedly abducted two women from the complainant's house---One of the alleged abductees appeared before the High Court and clearly stated that no such incident took place and she had married her husband of her own free-will---Other alleged abductee according to the complainant had contracted Nikah but her rukhsati had not taken place and she in her statement recorded under S.164, Cr. P. C. alleged that she was repeatedly raped by one of the accused persons, which fact was supported by the medical evidence---Validity---Contention of other alleged abductee was belied by two facts, firstly that said abductee was described in the F.LR. as the wife of a named person and secondly that in her statement recorded under S.164, Cr.P. C., she had stated that she wanted to go with her husband, but a girl whose rukhsati had not yet taken place, would obviously not like to go with her husband with whom only her Nikah had taken place---bail application of accused persons was allowed and pre-arrest bail already granted to theta was confirmed.
2012 YLR 425 LAHORE MUHAMMAD AMIN State
S. 497---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S.365-b ---Abducting woman to compel for marriage---bail , grant of---Accused was father of co-accused and he could not be expected to encourage or accompany his sons to commit an offence of moral turpitude or of abducting a woman---Accused was 80 years old---Factum of marriage between the co-accused and the alleged abductee was still to be probed into by Investigating Officer, who despite having received a copy of Nikahnama appeared to be reluctant to investigate the case from this angle---Co-accused had not been arrested so far---All able bodied male members of the family of the accused had been involved in the case---False implication of accused being father of co-accused and due to the malice or ulterior motives of the complainant, could not be ruled out---To keep the accused further incarcerated would be of no consequence to the prosecution case---bail was allowed to accused in circumstances.
2012 MLD 1530 LAHORE MUHAMMAD SIDDIQ State
S. 497(2)---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S. 365-b -Kidnapping, abducting or inducing woman to compel for marriage etc.---bail , grant of---Further inquiry---Allegation against the accused was that he abducted the daughter of the complainant and took her to another city, where he subjected her to zina---Contentions of the accused were that the alleged abductee was his legally wedded wife; that his Nikah Nama had not so far been challenged; that the alleged abductee had filed a private complaint before the Magistrate, wherein she admitted to be the lawfully wedded wife of the accused; that alleged abductee had filed a petition under S. 22-A, Cr.P.C, against her father and uncle; that alleged abductee had filed a suit for jactitation of marriage while the accused had filed a suit for restitution of conjugal rights, which suits were pending before the Family Court, and that there was an unexplained delay of nineteen (19) days in lodging of the F.I.R.---Validity---Alleged abductee had admitted in her statement under S. 164, Cr.P.C, that she had eloped with the accused---Alleged abductee accompanied the accused to a different city where both of them lived together---Copies of the Nikah Nama, application under S. 22-A, Cr.P.C. filed by the alleged abductee, private complaint lodged by the alleged abductee against her parents, and suits filed before the Family Court, were present on record---Family Court had not as yet decided about the genuineness of the Nikahnama---Investigating officer was unable to satisfy the court whether he had ever tried to investigate about the genuineness of the Nikah Nama---Case of accused required further probe in terms of S. 497(2), Cr.P.C---bail petition of the accused was allowed and he was released on bail , in circumstances.
2012 MLD 677 LAHORE MUHAMMAD ARIF SABRI State
S. 497(2)---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S.365-b ---Abduction---bail , grant of---Further inquiry---Benefit of doubt---Complainant despite having been informed by the witnesses about the abduction of his two daughters by the accused, had kept on searching them without informing the police for twenty one days---Said inordinate delay of 21 days in lodging the F.I.R. had cast serious doubts about the veracity of the complainant---Both the alleged abductees had completely contradicted each other in their statements recorded under S.161, Cr.P.C.---One abductee had stated that the accused had not abducted her or her sister and that she had contracted Nikah with a person with her free-will---Other abductee had levelled allegation of abduction and zina against the accused---Both these statements when juxtaposed had, prima facie, made the case against the accused doubtful requiring further inquiry into the matter---Benefit of doubt, howsoever slight, had to be given to accused even at bail stage---Nothing was to be recovered from the accused and their further detention behind the bars would not be useful for the prosecution---bail was allowed to accused in circumstances.
2012 YLR 633 SINDH KASHIF RAZA State
Ss. 498 & 497(2)---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss.365-b / 506(2)/ 342/34---Abduction, criminal intimidation, wrongful confinement---Pre-arrest bail , grant of---Further inquiry---Complainant had made two statements under S.164, Cr.P.C., one in favour of accused and the other against him---Was yet to be determined at the trial as to which statement was recorded according to the wishes of the complainant and which statement was recorded by force and compulsion---Co-accused more or less with the same allegation had already been granted bail ---Liberty of an innocent person is not to be curtailed unless proved otherwise---Pre-arrest bail could be extended to a person who did not, prima facie, appear to have committed a non-bail able offence or his guilt needed further probe within the meaning of S.497(2), Cr.P.C.---Case against accused appeared to be reasonably doubtful---Complainant was not alleged to have been forced or seduced to illicit intercourse---No reasonable grounds were available to believe that accused had committed a non-bail able offence and at this stage his case required further inquiry---Pre-arrest bail was allowed to accused in circumstances.
2011 YLR 1366 LAHORE ( ZAFAR IQBAL V/s State)
S. 498---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss.365-b & 376---Kidnapping, abduction or inducing woman to compel for marriage and rape---Pre-arrest bail , confirmation of----Accused was no more required for the purpose of investigation in the matter--Main accused had already been allowed bail after arrest---Case of accused who was witness of Nikah, was at better footing than the case of main accused who had been allowed bail ---Considerations for grant of bail before arrest and bail after arrest, were entirely different--Humiliation and unjustified harassment was a sine qua non for prearrest bail , besides the malafide of the complainant or the Police---Where arrest of accused was not necessary requirement of the Investigating Agency, sending accused behind the bars only for the reason that he could be released on bail after his arrest was altogether unjustified---Court while deciding such like cases, must avoid to be a party to please/satisfy the ego of the complainant party---Ad intern pre-arrest bail already allowed to accused was confirmed, in circumstances.
S.497(2)---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss.365-b /376---Abduction and rape---bail , grant of---Accused was not named in the F.I.R.---Abductee was stated to have solemnized marriage with the accused and sought protection of law to live with him as his wife---Accused had also filed a suit for restitution of conjugal rights for allowing the abductee to live with him as his wife---On the other hand statements of the alleged abductee recorded under Ss.161 and 164, Cr.P.C. involving the accused in the offence, were not supported by her medico legal report---Prima facie, case of accused needed further probe within the meaning of S.497(2), Cr. P. C. ---bail was allowed to accused in circumstances.( 2011 MLD 1020 lAHORE MUKHTAR AHMAD State)

2016 PLD 287 LHC
Gift was a personal action which could be performed by the owner only---attorney had no right to Gift property to any person on his own behalf ---Transfer of property in question in favour of his father by the attorney through Gift on his own behalf was not permissible under the law

15 December at 08:19 ·

Land Mark Judgement of SC
Supreme Court observed that "in our male dominated society where the female legal heirs, like sisters and mothers, were consistently deprived even of their 'sharai' shares in inheritance matters, the principle of caution in protecting the legitimate rights of the illiterate/rustic village lady, must be applied vigorously and rigidly."
2016 SCMR 1225
PLD 1990 SC 1

15
Cross-exam by parties
Order 18 R 4 (2)
----

16
Arguments
Order 18 R 2 (3A)
----

17
Judgment
Order 20

Out of these 17 main stages the amended code does not speak about any time limit for Examination of Parties - Order 10, Settlement of Disputes - Section 89, Production of Documents - Order 13, Exhibiting of Documents - Order 18 R 4 (1) proviso and Arguments - Order 18 R 2 (3A), but in the rest of the provisions the amended code has given time limits in the provisions itself and we cannot ignore them so easily and without any rare and exceptional circumstances.

Now once a party has filed the suit then he has to comply all the provisions one by one within the stipulated time. If the table shown as above is effectively implemented then no prejudice is likely to be caused to either of the parties and it will be a milestone in disposing off the civil suit in a stipulated time and that too within the framework of law, respecting the intention of the legislature. Now it is for us to decide whether to follow the provisions or the practice while interpreting and implementing the provisions of amended code.
In the amended code most of the provisions contains time limits for a particular stage. Maximum of the provisions are mandatory in nature and in very few of them the discretion lies with the court.
1. Plaintiff has to file the plaint complying the provisions in all respect as contemplated under Order 4 r/w Order 6 and 7 of the code.
2. Plaintiff has to issue summons within 30 days from the institution of suit.
3. After the service of summons defendant has to file his written statement within 30 days from the receipt of summons as per Order 8 R 1 of the code
4. No further time exceeding 90 days after date of service of summons be extended for filing written statement as per proviso to Order 8 R 1 of the code.
5. Within 10 days from the filing of written statement court has to examine the parties so as to explore the possibilities of compromise in between the parties and to refer the matter of settlement under section 89 of the code.
6. If parties fail to compromise the matter then court has to keep the matter for discovery and inspection within the time span of 7 – 10 – 10 – 3 days, as per Order 11 of the code.
7. Then to adjourn the matter for admission within the time span of 15 days as per Order 12 of the code.
8. Then parties have to file the original documents prior to framing of issues within the time span of 7 days, as per Order 13 of the code.
9. Court has to frame the issues within 15 days as per Order 14 of the code.
10. Parties have to file the list of witnesses within 15 days from the date of framing of issues as per Order 16 of the code.
11. Plaintiff has to issue summons to the witnesses either for adducing evidence or for production of documents within 5 days of filing of list as per Order 16 R 1 (4) of the code.
12. Parties have to settle the date of evidence as per Order 16 of the code.
13. Plaintiff has to file the affidavits of all his witnesses within 3 adjournments as per Order 18 R 4 r/w Order 17 of the code.
14. Court has to exhibit the documents considering their proof and admissibility with a reasoned order as per proviso to Order 18 R 4 (1) of the code.
15. Cross examination of the plaintiff and his witnesses on day to day until all the witnesses in attendance have been examined as per Order 18 R 4 (2) r/w Order 17 R 2 (a) of the code.
16. Defendant has to issue summons to the witnesses either for adducing evidence or for production of documents as per Order 16 R 1 (4) of the code.
17. Defendant has to file the affidavits of all his witnesses within 3 adjournments as per Order 18 R 4 r/w Order 17 of the code.
18. Court has to exhibit the documents considering their proof and admissibility with a reasoned order as per proviso to Order 18 R 4 (1) of the code.
19. Cross examination of the defendant and his witnesses on day to day until all the witnesses in attendance have been examined as per Order 18 R 4 (2) r/w Order 17 R 2 (a) of the code.
20. Parties have to conclude their arguments within 15 days from the completion of their respective evidence as per Order 18 R 2 (3A) of the code.
21. Court has to delivered judgment forthwith or on or before 30 days and not exceeding 60 days from the date of conclusion of the arguments as per Order 20 R 1 of the code.

CommentShare

1 1

Comments

Write a comment...

StatusPhoto/Video

VIRK LAW FORUM

8 hrs ·

Quranic Refrence of "Willوصیت "

قرآن حکیم 》سورہ ا لبقرہ،
آیات نمبر 177, 178, 179. پارہ 2

CommentShare

VIRK LAW FORUM

8 hrs ·

Brief sketch of criminal trial......

Beginning.....

FIR 154.............or ..... Direct complaint 200...

CommentShare

VIRK LAW FORUM

8 hrs ·

........... CLASSES OF CRIMINAL COURTS.............
sections 6 to 41.... CRPC
1- CLASSES OF CRIMINAL COURTS IN
PAKISTAN. (sec 6)
(i) HIGH COURT....

CommentShare

VIRK LAW FORUM

8 hrs ·

2016 PLD 287 LHC

Gift was a personal action which could be performed by the owner only---attorney had no right to Gift property to any person on his own behalf ---Transfer of property in question in favour of his father by the attorney through Gift on his own behalf was not permissible under the law.

CommentShare

VIRK LAW FORUM

15 December at 08:34 ·

#GeneralKnowledge

#Info
_____________________________
• Brasilia of Pakistan is called to Islamabad.

CommentShare

VIRK LAW FORUM

15 December at 08:31 ·

Syllabus of civil judge cum judicial magistrate announced by Lahore high court....

i) Civil Law:-
· The Punjab Rented Premises Act, 2009 · The Punjab Pre-Emption Act, 1991 · The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 ·
The Limitations Act, 1908 ...

CommentShare

Invite friends to like this Page

About

https://fbexternal-a.akamaihd.net/static_map.php?region=PK&v=27&osm_provider=3&size=306x98&zoom=15&markers=31.54970000%2C74.34360000&language=en_GB

Save

asif.virk@ymail.com

54000 Lahore

0333 4167120

Ask for VIRK LAW FORUM's hours

http://www.virklawforum.com/

Visitor Posts

Iftikhar Alam Shalmani

23 October at 00:45

See photo

1 LikeLike · Comment

Iftikhar Alam Shalmani

23 October at 00:43

See photo

Like · Comment

Asim Cheema

12 November 2014 at 21:35

See photo

1 LikeLike · Comment

People Also Like

British Pakistani Lawyers Council - BPLC

Organisation

Transparent Litigation Law Company

Criminal lawyer

Ministry of Commerce, Govt. of Pakistan

Government organisation

Criminal Lawyers in Lahore, Pakistan

English (UK) · English (US) · हिन्दी · اردو · فارسی

Privacy · Terms · Advertising · AdChoices · Cookies ·

In case calling for further inquiry ,mere abscondence is not sufficient to refuse bail.
2016 SCMR 1520
2016 SCMR 1593
2015 CrLJ 9 SC
PLD 2012 SC 222
2012 SCMR 1273
2012 SCMR 1137
PLJ 2012 SC 846
2009 SCMR 299.

2016 SCMR 862
2007 SCMR 262
NLR 1991 Civil 85
----
Fraud vitiates even the most solemn proceedings, question of fraud shall always be open to scrutiny before competent forum.
2007 SCMR 1884
---
Evidentiary value of photocopy---Held: could not be admitted without fulfilling conditions provided under Article 76 of QSO, 1984.
Transfer of land by an agent/attorney
Held: special permission is required from the owner while transferring the land to his close natives/blood relations.
---
2016 P.L.D Lah P-287
2009 S.C.M.R P-114
2003 P.L.D SC P-494
Accused had allegedly married the younger sister of his wife without having divorced her and thus was committing Zina with her younger sister --marriage of the accused with the sister of his wife under the Muhammadan Law was not void but was irregular and the issues of such marriage would be legitimate---Accused, therefore, could not be held to be committing Zina with his second wife ---Second marriage of the accused would become valid on his divorcing the first wife whom he had already claimed to have divorced--Accused seemed to have committed no offence---Bail was granted to accused in circumstances.
----
PLD 2004 Lah. 365
Co sharer would be considered to be in possession of each and every inch of un-partitioned land according to his share.
2016 S.C.M.R P-910

2007 S.C.M.R P-1884
2005 S.C.M.R P-1335
1998 S.C.M.R P-1589
1994 P.L.D S.C P-336
1992 S.C.M.R P-138
1989 S.C.M.R P-130

Determination of age of a juvinile...
PLD 2003 SC 656
2012 SCMR 1400 SC IND.
AGE DETERMINATION GUIDLINES...
PLD 2009 SC 777

Qanoon-e-Shahadat
(10 of 1984)
2016 Y L R 251 (b)
[Lahore]
[Amin-u-Din Khan, J]
{Mrs. PERIN J. DINSHAW}
Vs
{Mubarak Ali & another}
Arts. 59, 60 & 61 … Opinion of hand writing Expert … Scope … Report of handwriting expert, being opinion of such expert, was not binding on the court under the law … Opinion of expert was relevant but same did not amount to conclusive proof … Opinion of handwriting expert was a very weak type of evidence and same was only confirmatory or explanatory of direct or circumstantial evidence … Confirmatory evidence could n0ot be given preference where confidence inspiring evidence was available.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2016 Y L R 172 (c)
[Peshawar]
[Muhammad Daud Khan, J]
{Mst, Razia Bagum}
Vs
{Adam Khan & another}
Art. 79 … Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), S. 3 … Attesting witness and attestation in relation to instrument … Meaning and scope … Necessary conditions.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2016 Y L R 100 (b)
[Sindh]
[Nazar Akber, J]
{Muhammad Ayub}
Vs
{Miss Ambreen Naz}
Art. 103 … Exclusion of evidence of oral agreement … Scope … Written agreement could not be defeated by an oral agreement.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2016 Y L R 188 (e)
[Balochistan]
[Muhammad Ejaz Sawati, J]
{Abdul Zaheer}
Vs
{Khud-e-Dad & others}
Art. 129 (g) … Court may presume existence of certain facts … Best evidence, which could be produced by defendants, had not been produced and had been intentionally withheld, for which adverse inference was to be taken against them under Art. 129(g), Qanoon-e-Shahadat, 1984.

Penal Code
(XLV of 1860)

2016 S C M R 274 (d)
[Supreme Court of Pakistan]
[Asif Saeed Khan Khosa, Mushir Aalam & Dost Muhammad khan, JJ]
{Azeem Khan}
Vs.
{Mujahid Khan}

Ss. 365-A 7 302(b) … Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), S. 7(e) … Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), Ss. 164 & 364 … Kidnapping for ransom, qatl-e-amd … Reappraisal of evidence …Judicial confession, recording of … Illegalities committed by Magistrate in recording confession of accused … Effect … Judicial confession unworthy of reliance … Recording Magistrate committed successive illegalities as after recording the confessions of the accused persons on oath, both were handed over to the same police officer, who had produced them in the court in handcuffs … Recording Magistrate was either unaware of the law on the subject or he was acting on the desire of the police, compromising his judicial obligations … Such careless attitude of the Magistrate provided premium to the investigation agency because it was thereafter, that the recoveries of the so called incriminating articles were made at the instance of the accused persons … Recording Magistrate did not put many mandatory questions to the accused persons like duration of police custody and he also did not inform them that they would not be given back to the police whether they recorded the confession or not … Confession of accused persons in such circumstances were of no legal worth, and had to be excluded from consideration, more so, when these were retracted at the trial … Even otherwise confession of the accused persons prima facie appeared to be untrue because the same contradicted the story set up by prosecution witnesses on material particulars of eth case … Supreme Court set aside convictions and death sentences awarded to accused persons and acquitted them of the charge.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2016 S C M R 274 (j)
[Supreme Court of Pakistan]
[Asif Saeed Khan Khosa, Mushir Aalam & Dost Muhammad khan, JJ]
{Azeem Khan}
Vs.
{Mujahid Khan}

Ss. 365-A 7 302(b) … Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), S. 7(e) … Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 510 … Kidnapping for ransom, qatl-e-amd … Reappraisal of evidence … Recovery of bones to identify deceased … DNA report of bones … Not admissible in evidence … Not sufficient to award capital punishment … Even if in the present case such DNA report was admitted into the evidence and relied upon, it would in no manner be sufficient to connect the neck of the accused persons with the commission of the crime when the bulk of other evidence against them was found to be unbelievable thus, no reliance could be placed on such DNA report to award a capital sentence … To ensure a fair play and transparency, the sample in the laboratories from the parents (of deceased) should have been taken in the presence of some independent authority like a Magistrate and also the recovered samples from the crime scene in the same way to dispel the chances of fabrication of evidence through corrupt practices … Transition of the samples to the laboratory should have also been made in a safe and secure manner, but all such safeguards were ignored in the present case … Supreme Court set aside convictions and death sentences of awarded to accused persons and acquitted them of the charge.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2016 S C M R 274 (a)
[Supreme Court of Pakistan]
[Asif Saeed Khan Khosa, Mushir Aalam & Dost Muhammad khan, JJ]
{Azeem Khan}
Vs.
{Mujahid Khan}

Ss. 365-A 7 302(b) … Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), S. 7(e) … Kidnapping for ransom, qatl-e-amd … Reappraisal of evidence … Benefit of doubt … Un-witnesses crime … Lack of corroborative evidence … Voice data of phone calls not presented … Recovery memo witnesses ‘interested witnesses’ … Crime in question was an un-witnessed incident and based only on circumstantial evidence and recovery of incriminating articles … Important links in the chain of story set up by the prosecution were missing due to lack of corroborative evidence … No voice record transcript of calls had been brought on record to prove the ransom demand … Area from which the call for ransom was made, was not shown … Most crucial and conclusive proof that the cell phone from which ransom demand was made was owned by the accused and SIM allotted was in his name was also missing … Attesting witnesses of recovery memo were related to the deceased and thus were highly interested witnesses … Number of bones, allegedly belonging to deceased, which were recovered on the pointation of accused persons did not match with the number of bones sent for analysis to the Forensic Science Laboratory … Trial Court had relied on highly cryptic and infirm evidence to award death sentence to accused persons … Supreme Court set aside convictions and death sentences awarded to accused persons and acquitted them of the charge.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2016 S C M R 274 (h)
[Supreme Court of Pakistan]
[Asif Saeed Khan Khosa, Mushir Aalam & Dost Muhammad khan, JJ]
{Azeem Khan}
Vs.
{Mujahid Khan}

Ss. 365-A 7 302(b) … Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), S. 7(e) … Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 510 … Kidnapping for ransom, qatl-e-amd … Reappraisal of evidence … Medical jurisprudence … Decomposition of human body … Recovery of bones … Doubt as to whether an human body could decompose into bones within a month … Pieces of bones allegedly belonging to deceased were discovered about a month after his murder … Such (rapid) destruction of entire body of a human being was not possible within a month because some viscera’s made of tough tissues and full skeleton of human body remained intact … In the present case, only scattered pieces of bones were recovered and not full Skelton of human body, which by itself was unbelievable, being against the well established and universally recognized juristic view on the subject … Recovery of pieces of bones after one month was entirely doubtful /… Supreme Court set aside convictions and death sentences awarded to accused persons and acquitted them of the charge.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2016 S C M R 267 (a)
[Supreme Court of Pakistan]
[Mian Saqib Nisar & Manzoor Ahmed Malik, JJ]
{Muhammad nawaz & Others}
Vs.
{The State & others}

Ss. 449, 376(2) & 392 … House trespass to commit robbery and rape … Reappraisal of evidence … Benefit of doubt … Delay of a month in lodging F.I.R … Un-natural conduct of a victim in not raising hue and cry during rape … Probability of false implication … Absence of medical report/opinion on record … Doubtful extra judicial confession … Detail of robbed articles not provided in the F.I.R … Accused persons were acquitted of the charges against them by extending them benefit of doubt.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

LikeShow More Reactions

Comment

Share

LEADING CASE LAWS ON
*PAKISTAN PENAL CODE (PPC) *
FROM 1947 TO 2016

In case of accident only 320 PPC will attract even having no driving license. (2000 P.Cr. L.J 230)

Confessional statement which is not corroborated by other independent evidence has got no value in eye of law. (S. 302 PPC / PLJ 2000 Quetta 1357)

Possession implicate of a counterfeits currency notes does not constitute an offence under S. 489 B PPC (S. 489 B PPC / 1996 P.Cr. L. J 815)

Qatal does not means murder. Qatal amount in which intention is involved qatal I khata is not qatal amad and fell u/s 320 ppc (PLJ 1996 Cr.c (Pesh) 733)

Civil suit is pending before civil court. Bail granted. (Ss. 468, 471, 420 PPC / 2007 SCMR 1546, 2005 YLR 475, 2008 YLR 778, 2008 YLR 732, 2008 YLR 2953)

Nobody hit no crime empties were recovered. Bail allowed (u/s 324, 353, 34 PPC / 2007 P. Cr.L.J 98)

Two kinds of abscondance (I ) in which destroy prosecution evidence (ii) abscondance to save himself from harassment of police, no evidence of destruction of evidence. Bail Allowed. Bail allowed. (u/s 324, 430, 425, 34 PPC / PLD 2007 (Kar)127, 2009 YLR 816)

Accused were close relatives of the complainant and is no reasons for their false implication in case (u/s 379, 354, 452, 148, 149 PPC / 2007 YLR 1192)

Material was not sent to expert for opinion. Material was black paper and a bottle of chemical. Nothing on record that such material could be used for counterfeiting the currency . further inquiry allowed (S. 489-D/34 PPC / 2009 YLR 5 Islamabad)

Complainant initially had nominated the accused in FIR but later on through an affidavit he had expressed has satisfied with regard to the innocence of accused and did not want to proceed with matter. Further inquiry. Bail allowed. (u/s 365/34 PPC / 2009 SCMR 448)

u/s 420, 468, 471 PPC and other cognate offences both remedies are available criminal and civil but the preference was given to civil court to decide the matter in accordance with law. (PSC (crl.) 1993 SC PK 676 (a) )

Bail granted on compromise in non- compoundable offence. (S. 365/34 PPC / 2009 SCMR 448)

S.354-A PPC would be attracted where victim was stripped of her clothes and was exposed to public view in that condition. (S.354-A PPC / 2011 YLR 212)

Preparation of CD of scene of occurrence is not a proof of offence had been committed. (S. 371 B 294 PPC / 2011 YLR 353)

S. 420, 468, 471, 419 PPC (2011 YLR 1153, 2011 YLR 1236, 2011 YLR 1599)

Cancellation bail u/s 406 PPC (2009 YLR 1270, 2009 P.Cr.L.J 1302 )

Cheque book was lost application was moved to banks manager for stop of payment. Also to civil court is pending before the civil court. Bail confirmed. (S. 489 F PPC / 2009 YLR 28 Lah.)

Earlier bail application of accused was dismissed, standard of complainant was recorded by trial court who had exonerated the accused. Bail allowed (S. 395 PPC / 2007 P. Cr. L.J 1918)

Absconding of accused effect. Co-accused had already been acquitted by trial court. No recovery was effected. Bail cannot by refused only on ground of ascendance. (S. 392,397,413, 216-A PPC / 2009 YLR 925)

Bail granted. (S. 382/411 PPC / 2010 YLR 2716, 2006 YLR 2987, 2002 MLD 1437, 2001 YLR 2309)

Bail question contention that the case fell u/s 411 PPC. It was not coming on record as to why identification test of the petition was not held. When his name did not appear in the FIR . the non holding of identification test of the petitioner through eye witnesses would weight in favor of his being released on bail when his name did not appear in the FIR. (1995 P. Cr. L.J 88, 1996 PSC (crl.)SC 328)

Not nominated in the FIR no featured description in FIR only recovery of stolen car from the possession of the petitioner does not make the petitioner on accused of theft. (S. 381 A PPC / 209 YLR 106 Kar.)

Complaint got registered FIR and nominated four accused in FIR. After two days complainant on his supplementary statement somersault and aelipsed. Two nominated accused person and introduced three other persons to have committed alleged offence of dacoity. The case of further inquiry. Bail accepted. (S.392/395 PPC / PLJ 2000 Cr.c Lah. 558 )

Such the case would fall under s. 411 PPC. Bail allowed. (1989 ALD 555(1), 1989 ALD 570 (1))

Litigation between the parties is pending before the civil court about same cause of action which is subject matter of present FIR. Petitioner has also leveled allegations against SHO. FIR was lodged after delay of four months which has not been explained. bail confirmed (pre-arrest bail. S. 380 PPC / PLJ 2000 Lah. 193)

Case does not fall under prohibitory clause. Bail allowed. (S. 419, 420, 411 PPC / PLJ 2000 Pesh. 1028)
Case of prima facie there is only recovery of stolen goods from the petitioner and as (S.457, 380 PPC / PLJ 2000 Cr.c Pesh. 401)

An accused of sec. 430 PPC cannot be challenged u/s 379 PPC as 379 PPC is not applicable in a case of canal diminution of water. (S. 430, 379 PPC / PLD 1997 Lah. 689)

Identification parade is necessary when the accused were unknown to the complainant before the occurrence. (S. 392, 396 PPC / 1995 P.Cr. L.J 88)

In case of further inquiry, the bail is the right of accused. (S. 382, 170, 171, 395, 411 PPC / PLJ 2000 Lah. 711)

There is previous litigation between (S. 394, 411 PPC / PLJ 2000 Lah. 828)

Though the offence is not compoundable but the compromise was affected by the investigation of elders of locality at bail stage consideration. (S. 496-A, 365-B, 380 PPC / 2009 YLR 49(a) Pesh.)

No evidence of buying or selling woman agent. Petition allowed. (S.371, 371-B PPC / 2009 YLR 60 Lah.)

Victim is 8/9 years old. He could not rush himself to police station this delay cannot be considered. Even if there is not actual penetration, entry of male organ of accused into artificial cavity between the thighs of victim amounted to penetration and canal intercourse. Bail allowed.(S. 377 PPC / PLJ 2000 Pesh. 955)

No evidence of enmity between the parties. No reason was shown as to falsely implication os accused person. Specific role was attributed to accused offence is punishable with 25 years. Bail cancelled. (S. 12/7/79 , 377 PPC / PLJ 2000 Lah. 1219)

Both the offences are not compoundable however, parties have compounded out of court and do not want to prosecute the case further. Bail accepted.(S. 377 PPC , 12/7/79 H.O, PLJ 1999 Cr.c Lah. 861, 2009 P. Cr.L.J 260, 2009 P. Cr.L.J 197, 2009 P. Cr.L.J 260)

Victim accompanied the accused voluntarily abduction can not be proved and the S. 346 is bail bale. Bail accepted (S. 12/7/79 H.O, 346 PPC / 2001 P. Cr. L.J 1022)

Only for this that the accused says that the allegations leveled against accused are false. The criminal proceedings cannot be extinguished. (S.182/211 PPC / PLD 1993 kar. 355)

Punishment is seven years and bail able offence. Bail allowed. (S.201 PPC / 2009 MLD 37)

Offence being punishable with five years as rule. Bail confirmed. (S. 337 A(i), 337 F (i), 504, 34 PPC / 2007 P. Cr. L.J 55, 116)

Pre arrest bail . four culprits had been saddled but no specific injury had been attributed to any culprit. It was impossible to determine with any degree of certainty as to whether the present petitioner were responsible for commission of bailabe offence or the non bailable offence. Bail confirmed. (S. 337 A (i), 337 A (ii) PPC / PLD 2007 Lah 633)

During investigation number of respectable was produce before I.O who stated about the innocence of petitioner. One I.O found innocent and one found guilty case of further inquiry. Allowed. (S. 324/34 PPC / 2009 MLD 88 Lah.)
Two kinds of abscondance. In which destroy prosecution evidence and abscondance to save himself from harassment. No destroy of evidence. Bail allowed. (S. 324, 430, 425, 34 PPC / PLD 2007 Kar. 127)

The role attributed to the petitioner is not repeated so the offence u/s 324 does not sontitute by the petitioner. Delay in lodging the FIR is two hours while the distance between the spot and police station is only 100 steps. Bail accepted. (S.324/147, 148,149, 504/114, 337 A (iii) PPC 2001 P. Cr.L.J 1127)

During police encounter nobody was injured from both sides not any vehicle was hit. Even the firing was attributed with lethal weapons like as klashin cove. So the case of further inquiry. (S. 324,353,148,149 PPC / 1996 P. Cr.L.J 1573, 2007 P. Cr.L.J )

Challan submitted to anti terrorism court challenge to. Offences were committed on account of previous enmity and a definite motive. Hence not tri able by anti terrorism court buy by ordinary court of competent jurisdiction. (S. 365,337,337 F(i), 148,149 PPC / PLJ 2000 Lah. 799)

Petitioner alleged with six injuries but only one is found on skull of victim of assault supported by medical evidence not punishable with 10 years or more no explanation regarding injuries has been offered by prosecution who is aggressor or aggressed is a material question. No more required for investigation. Bail allowed. (S.337 A (ii), 337 L (ii), 34 PPC / PLJ 2000 Lah. 878)

When an accused of same offence declared innocent by police. The other co accused should be given the benefit of doubt. (S.324/34 / PLJ 1997 Pesh. 1120)

State counsel stated that petitioner armed with weapons in furtherance of their common intention to cause hurt, therefore at bail stage their liability cannot be segregated . injuries attributed to petitioner also do not fall within prohibitory clause discretion of bail should be extended to them specially when they are behind bars for the last three months. Bail allowed. (S. 337 A (i), 337 A (iii), 337 L (ii)(iii) PPC / PLJ 2000 Lah. 1384)

Nature of injuries do not bring case within prohibitory clause, this appears to be case of brawl. Where both parties scuffled and injured each other opposite party has already been granted brawl. Being cross case it is natter of further inquiry as to which of party was aggressor. Bail allowed. (S. 337 A (ii), 337 A (iii), 337 F (6), 337 D (2), 34 PPC / PLJ 2000 Lah. 1276)

Free fight between parties using hatchets and lathis resulting into lodging of cross version against each other. Difficult to ascertain at such stage as to who was aggressor. Bail allowed. (2010 SCMR 1219 / S. 324 PPC)
Benefit of partial compromise can not be given to the accused with out the consent of all legal heirs of the deceased. Bail rejected. (S. 497(5), 302,34,109 PPC / PLJ 2000 Lah. 890)

Old age alone would not be a ground on which bail could be granted under all circumstance. Abscondance of accuses was another factor on which too bail could be refused. Empties and spent bullets were recovered from the spot. Two witnesses were supporting the prosecution version. Bail refused. (S. 302, 324, 34 PPC / PLJ 2000 Pesh. 937)

vicarious liability (S. 34 PPC / 1986 NLR SC 885, PLJ 2000 Pesh 793)

To grant of bail when prosecution has no other evidence against him and he otherwise, entitled to bail. (S. 109 PPC / NLR 2001 454, NLR 2000 5572)

Non of accused was nominated in FIR and no identification parade had taken place which necessary for just decision of case. Identification parade at police station has no legal role in eye of law.(S. 302,392/3, 411/34 PPC / PLJ 2000 Lah. 631)

Accused who had a already been bailed out by court, had prayed for incorporation of S.368 PPC . in bail order, contending that earlier that section was not mentioned in FIR. Thus it was not pressed in to service in main bail application. No allegation u/s 368 PPC was leveled against accused in FIR. But same was invoked much after even otherwise invocation of that section would not make much difference respecting fate of case. Accused would have been admitted bail. (1993 P.Cr.L.J 743)

Victim accompanied the accused voluntarily abduction can not be proved and the S. 346 is bail bale. Bail accepted (S. 12/7/79 H.O, 346 PPC / 2001 P. Cr. L.J 1022)

Free fight between parties using hatchets and latis resulting into lodging of cross cases against each other. Complainant side accused enlarged on bail. Other party is also entitled to bail (S. 324 PPC / 2010 CMR 1219)
Only for this that the accused says that the allegations leveled against accused are false. The criminal proceedings cannot be extinguished. (S.182/211 PPC / PLD 1993 kar. 355)

Punishment is seven years and bail able offence. Bail allowed. (S.201 PPC / 2009 MLD 37)

Offence being punishable with five years as rule. Bail confirmed. (S. 337 A(i), 337 F (i), 504, 34 PPC / 2007 P. Cr. L.J 55, 116)

Punishment is five years not covered by prohibitory clause. Bail allowed. (S. 337 A (ii) PPC / 2009 MLD 21 Kar.)

Two kinds of abscondance. In which destroy prosecution evidence and abscondance to save himself from harassment. No destroy of evidence. Bail allowed. (S. 324, 430, 425, 34 PPC / PLD 2007 Kar. 127)

When an accused of same offence declared innocent by police. The other co accused should be given the benefit of doubt. (S.324/34 / PLJ 1997 Pesh. 1120)

Benefit of partial compromise can not be given to the accused with out the consent of all legal heirs of the deceased. Bail rejected. (S. 497(5), 302,34,109 PPC / PLJ 2000 Lah. 890)

vicarious liability (S. 34 PPC / 1986 NLR SC 885, PLJ 2000 Pesh 793)

To grant of bail when prosecution has no other evidence against him and he otherwise, entitled to bail. (S. 109 PPC / NLR 2001 454, NLR 2000 5572)

Petitioner was not nominated in FIR. No recovery. (PLJ 2000 Lah. 606)

Not nominated in FIR. No direct evidence is available in such situation the case is of further probe. (S.302 PPC / PLJ 2000 Lah. 706)
Petitioner is named in FIR as empty handed. He caused no injury to deceased or any of witnesses of occurrence. Only lalkara is attributed to him makes his case of further inquiry. He is behind bars for last more than 8 months. Bail allowed. (S. 302/34 PPC / PLJ 2000 Lah. 960)

Bail grant of on ground of sickness as per report of doctor, petitioner is suffering from chonic schizpphronia to and his treatment in jail is not possible. (S. 302 PPC / PLJ 2000 Pesh. 970)

Only one injury to deceased was attributed to co accused. Accused was attributed only that he along with others took the deceased from his arms and legs and threw on the ground and the other accused blew the dagger on deceased. The case is one of further inquiry. Bail accepted. (S.302/109/148/149 PPC / 2001 P.Cr.L.J 1038 )

Role attributed to petitioner that he was present at the spot armed with pistol. But no attribution of injury to the deceased or any other person. Only co accused has snatched his pistol, co accused allegedly to cause injury to deceased person. No recovery has been made from the petitioner. Question if petitioner has shared his common intention with his co accused is to be seen a time of trial. At this stage case comes into the further inquiry. Bail allowed. (S. 302/34, 109 PPC / PLJ 2000 Lah. 1416)

Witnesses of occasion informed police after two months of registration of FIR against some other person. Chief witness is real nephew of deceased. Further judicial confession has always been treated a very weak type of evidence. No empties were recovered from the spot. Bail granted. (S. 302/34, 109 PPC / PLJ 2000 Lah. 879)

Petitioner was declared innocent by the police during the investigation and with approval of DSP, his case was recommended for discharge. Petitioner did not cause any injury to deceased . injury allegedly attributed to petitioner on person injured PW is on right lower part of thigh which according to medico legal report is declared as “ghyr jaifa badiha” and is punishable with three years R.I question of sharing common intention by petitioner along with other co accused can only be determined by trial court after recording evidence. Prima facie case of petitioner does not fall within prohibitory clause of sec.497 Cr.p.C grant of bail in such like cases is a rule and refusal is exceptional accordingly. Bail allowed.(S. 302,324,109,179,148 PPC / PLJ 2000 Lah. 1392)

Ss. 148, 149 and 441-Unlawful assembly-Criminal trespass.

The attempt on the part of M to prevent A from using his land amounted to criminal trespass, and if he collected several persons with a view to resisting cultivation of the land by A, he and the persons so collected constituted an unlawful assembly. It must be remembered that the right of private defence is always against an act that is an offence, and on the evidence in this case it is impossible to hold that when A in 1947 sowed the land or attempted to exercise on it some right of ownership he was committing an offence.

Right of private defence
Right of private defence of person or property-Right of private defence is always against an act that is an offence-No such right established in this case.

No question of self-defence would arise if either the prosecution case as disclosed by the witnesses or the findings of the learned Judge be accepted. The defence allegation cannot possibly be accepted in view of the inability of the defence to explain the injuries that were found on the persons of members of A's party, but even if it be assumed that A's party attempted to cultivate the land by force, it would make no difference in law as they were entitled to do so and M had no right to prevent them merely by reason of his having wrongfully cultivated the land six months earlier in the preceding kharif. The attack on A's party having been admitted, it was for the defence to prove with that degree of probability as is required by the Court when an accused person is required to prove a fact, that they were ju

stified to kill three men and badly injured four others.
P L D 1949 Lahore 42s

2015 SCMR 423
Ss.164 & 342...statement of an accused recorded under s.342, Cr.P.C was more reliable, compared to the statement recorded under sec. 164,Cr.P.C

(2015.PSC. (CRL) 850)
BAIL OF ACCUSED CAN NOT BE CANCELLED UNTILL AND UNLESS SERIOUS VIOLATION OF LAW AND INJUSTICE HAS NOT BEEN COMMITTED BY THE CULPRIT/ACCUSED.

Pakistan Penal Code ----Ss.308, 305(b), 310(3), 313(2)(a), 313 & 314---Government responsible for payment of Diyat when neither the accused nor his Wali had any property for realization of the same---Accused had served out his entire sentence and now he was only confined in jail for non-payment of Diyat---Inquiry conducted by the Trial Court had revealed that the accused or his Wali had no property--Government in absence of any other source for payment of Diyat was Wali for the minor offender and also on behalf of the legal heirs of the deceased according to law---Direction already issued to the State by the High Court for recovery of Diyat and its payment to the legal heirs of the deceased still held the field and had attained finality---Home Secretary, Government of Punjab, was consequently directed to ensure the compliance of the said direction for deposit of Diyat amount in the Trial Court after taking up the matter with the concerned quarter and the Authorities controlling "Baitul Maal" within a period of two months, failing which the Trial Court was directed to take necessary steps for the recovery and payment of Diyat by attachment/sale of State movable or immovable property 9 in accordance with law---Accused having served out his substantial sentence was released on bail in the mean time.

2001 YLR 533 LAHORE-HIGH-COURT-LAHORE
Side Appellant : ZAFAR
Side Opponent : STATE

2016.CLC.ISLAMABAD.1838
POWER OF ATTORNEY IN QUESTION HAD NOT CONFERRED ON THE ATTORNEY ANY RIGHT, TITLE AND INTEREST IN THE IMMOVABLE PROPERTY RATHER IT WAS FOR THE PURPOSE TO INITIATE LEGAL PROCEEDINGS OR DEFEND THE SAME WITH REGARD TO PROPERTY IN QUESTION SUCH DOCUMENT WAS NOT COMPULSORY REGISTERABLE

Power Attorney can be revoked orally........
2016 MLD 1243
1996 MLD 1123
2005 SCMR 1315
2002 SCMR 1821
2008 SCMR 1384
PLD 1986 LAH 284

2005 CLC 424.
Where an easement has been disturbed,the plaintiff is entitled to an injunction rather than damages

181 ppc...
Whoever, being legally bound by an oath or affirmation to state the truth on any subject to any public servant or other person authorized by law to administer such oath or affirmation, makes, to such public servant or other person as aforesaid, touching that subject any statement which is false, and which he either knows or believes to be false or does not believe to be true, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, and shall also be liable to fine

Bail was allowed to accused lady ground suckling baby without touching merits as a right.
2012.Pcrlj lhr 841
plj 2013 crc karachi 704
2011 YLR 2975
2006 pcrlj 251
Pld 2005 lhr 352
Pld 2005 crc lhr 1190
1996 scmr 973
Reference of Ghamidya case DECIDED BY HAZRAT MUHAMMAD (S.A.Ws

If alienation of property during pendency of litigation is allowed then such act would amount to permitting endless multiple litigation destroying doctrine of lis pendens.
2004 SCMR 578
2004 SCMR 813
1976 SCMR 385
2007 CLC 177
2004 CLC 421
2004 CLC 546
1995 CLC 178

12 December at 23:57 ·

Ss. 449, 376 (2) & 392--- House-trespass to commit robbery and rape---Re-appraisal of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Delay of a month in lodging FIR---Unnatural conduct of victim in not raising hue and cry during rape---Probability of false implication---Absence of medical report/opinion on record---Doubtful extra judicial confession---Details of robbed articles not provided in the FIR--- Accused persons were acquitted of the charges against them by extending them benefit of doubt.
2016 SCMR 267 SUPREME-COURT
Side Appellant : MUHAMMAD NAWAZ
Side Opponent : State

PLD.2016.S.C.64.
..LAND ACQUISITION ACT..
1894...SECTION..34....
..PAYMENT OF INTREST ON COMPENSATION...AWARD OF SUCH INTREST WAS STATUTORY IN NATURE, AND COULD NOT BE WITHHELD

2015 CLC 34 ....court has duty to protect its process from being abused ,which is in nature of fiduciary duty which court owe towards public and bona fide litigants

NLR 2015 AC 38.....court can not condone violation of public fiduciary duties of state functionaries Because doing so will lead to an erosion of the basis of state s legal authority and rule of law

2015 PLD 336 LAHORE-HIGH-COURT-LAHORE
S. 5, Sched.---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Suit for recovery of maintenance allowance for adopted minor---Concept of "constructive guardian ship"---Fiduciary obligations and duties of adoptive parents towards minor---Question before the High Court was whether husband /adoptive father was compelled to pay maintenance allowance for minor who had been adopted by the parents during the time of their marriage---Held, that per concept of adoption in Islam, the wife could not claim maintenance from the husband for minor who had no rizai relationship with the adoptive mother; however from the angle of the concept of "constructive guardian ship", the petitioner/adoptive mother was entitled to claim maintenance allowance for such adopted minor---High Court observed that if adoptive parents voluntarily undertake, before public at large, to perform the noble task of taking care of a minor, by doing as they not only create a relationship of trust with the minor but also assume the role and status of "constructive guardian " of minor---Trust and constructive guardian ship also created a fiduciary obligation/relation between the adopted parents and the minor----Fiduciary was a person in a position of trust, or occupying a position of power and confidence with respect to another, such that he was obliged by various rules of law to act solely in the interest of the other, whose rights he had to protect---Doctrine of "constructive guardian ship" has been a part of the law of guardian s and wards for a long time and such a situation arose where one assumes to act as a guardian or enters upon an infant's estate, who has not been regularly appointed as guardian , which may result from a voluntary assumption of the duties, a void appointment by a court without jurisdiction, or acts performed by one who was by himself and other parties concerned, considered an "accommodation guardian "---Recognition of the need for protection of the infant / minor resulted in giving such a minor an election to treat such a person as a wrongdoer or as a guardian and in the later case a relation similar to that of trustee and cestui que trust was established and the guardian de son tort may be compelled to account as a guardian ---In the present case, the minor was adopted by the parents and remained with the adoptive parents for a considerable period of time and the husband /respondent had admitted that the minor was adopted and presented as his daughter before the public-at-large; and therefore for all intents and purposes the acts of the husband /respondent had created relationship of trust and constructive guardian ship between the husband and the minor which also implied fiduciary obligations and duties to be performed by the husband /respondent; which inevitably included the maintenance of the minor---High Court held that the respondent/husband was therefore obligated to pay maintenance allowance for his adopted daughter---Impugned orders were set aside, and constitutional petition was allowed, in circumstances.

Latest supreme court authority on limitation Act
Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in Court without jurisdiction---Application of S.14 of the Limitation Act, 1908 was restricted to suits only and had no direct and independent application to cases where an appeal had been filed before a wro

(a) Limitation Act (IX of 1908) ---

----Ss. 3 & 5 & Preamble---Law of limitation, interpretation of---Salient features of interpretation of the law of limitation listed.

Following are the salient features which have been settled by the superior Courts for the purposes of interpretation of the law of limitation;

(i) The law of limitation was a statute of repose, designed to quieten title and to bar stale and water-logged disputes and was to be strictly complied with. Statutes of limitation by their very nature were strict and inflexible. Law of limitation does not confer a right; it only regulates the rights of the parties. Such a regulatory enactment could not be allowed to extinguish vested rights or curtail remedies, unless all the conditions for extinguishment of rights and curtailment of remedies were fully complied with in letter and spirit. There was no scope in law of limitation for any equitable or ethical construction. Justice, equity and good conscience did not override the law of limitation. Object of law of limitation was to prevent stale demands and so it ought to be construed strictly;

2016 PLC (CS) 195; 2010 PLC (Labour) 104; 2007 SCMR 1446; 2003 YLR 1837; PLD 2004 AJ&K 38; PLD 2005 Lah 129; PLD 1958 (WP) Lah 936; PLD 2005 Lah 129; 2013 CLC 403; 2003 YLR 1837 and PLD 1962 (WP) Dacca 381 ref

(ii) The hurdles of limitation could not be crossed under the guise of any hardships or imagined inherent discretionary jurisdiction of the court. Ignorance, negligence, mistake or hardship did not save limitation, nor does poverty of the parties;

AIR 1940 Rang 276 (FB); PLD 2003 SC 628; 2002 PLC (CS) 526; 2002 PLC (CS) 474; PLD 2002 SC 101; 1998 PLC (CS) 1007; 1988 SCMR 1354 and 1987 PLC (CS) 200 ref.

(iii) It was salutary to construe exceptions or exemptions to a provision in a statute of limitation rather liberally while a strict construction was enjoined as regards the main provision. For when such a provision was set up as a defence to an action, it had to be clearly seen if the case came strictly within the ambit of the provision;

25 Cal 496, 503 ref.

(iv) There was absolutely no room for the exercise of any imagined judicial discretion vis-à-vis interpretation of a provision, whatever hardship may result from following strictly the statutory provision. There was no scope for any equity. The court could not claim any special inherent equity jurisdiction;

AIR 1935 All 323 ref.

(v) Statute of limitation instead of being viewed in an unfavourable light, as an unjust and discreditable defence, should receive such support from courts of justice as would have made it what it was intended to be, a statute of repose. Plea of limitation could not be deemed as an unjust or discreditable defence. There was nothing morally wrong and there was no disparagement to the party pleading it. It was not a mere technical plea as it was based on sound public policy and no one should be deprived of the right he had gained by the law. It was indeed often a righteous defence. The court had to only see if the defence was good in law and not if it was moral or conscientious;

48 Cal 110 (PC); AIR 1933 PC 230; 54 All 1067 (PC); AIR 1935 All 323 and 56 Cal 575 ref.

(vi) The intention of the law of limitation was not to give a right where there was not one, but to interpose a bar after a certain period to a suit to enforce an existing right.

21 Cal 8, 18 (PC) ref.

(vii) The law of limitation was an artificial mode conceived to terminate justiciable disputes. It therefore had to be construed strictly with a leaning to benefit the suitor;

AIR 1966 Pat 1 (FB) ref.

(viii) Reading of the Preamble and Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 showed that the fundamental principle was to induce the claimants to be prompt in claiming rights. Unexplained delay or laches on the part of those who were expected to be aware and conscious of the legal position and who had facilities for proper legal assistance could hardly be encouraged or countenanced.

AIR 1966 Raj 213 ref.

(b) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)---

----S. 14---Appeal filed before wrong forum---Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in Court without jurisdiction---Application of S.14 of the Limitation Act, 1908 was restricted to suits only and had no direct and independent application to cases where an appeal had been filed before a wrong forum.

From the word the "suit" which appeared in section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1908, it was abundantly clear that the said section applied to suits and there was no mention of appeal or revision etc. Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1908 was exclusively and solely restricted to suits and suits alone. If it was taken to apply to appeals also, this would tantamount to reading into the section the word "appeal" which did not appear in the said section and such a reading would be contrary to the definition of the word "suit" in the statute. Express provisions of law could not be defeated by resorting to any rule of interpretation which would have the convoluted effect of rendering an appeal a continuation of the suit for the purposes of attracting the application of section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1908.

----Rule of casus omissus---Scope --- In terms of the said rule the courts were not entitled to read words into an Act of Parliament unless clear reasons for it were found within the four corners of the Act itself.

(1910) 79 LJKB 955 and AIR 1980 SC 485 and Dr. Syed Sibtain Raza Naqvi v. Hydrocarbon Development and others 2012 SCMR 377 ref.

(d) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)---

----Ss. 5 & 14---Appeal filed before wrong forum---Condonation of delay---Sufficient cause---Whether the principles of S.14 of the Limitation Act, 1908 could be resorted to for the purposes of determining sufficient cause under S.5 of the said Act---For the purposes of determining whether in a given case sufficient cause had been made out for condonation of delay when an appeal had been filed before a wrong forum, there did not seem to be any bar in law that the conditions or the limitation prescribed by S.14 could not be looked into---However, the conditions laid down in S.14 must be satisfied and established on the record---Term 'sufficient cause' had to be given the widest possible amplitude and in so doing the conditions/principles of S.14 of the Limitation Act, 1908 could not be left out.

For the purposes of determining whether in a given case sufficient cause had been made out for condonation of delay when an appeal had been filed before a wrong forum, no hard and fast rule could be laid down; there could not and should not be a simple test for determining the same. The establishing of sufficient cause was not amenable to mathematical formulae. Courts were called upon in individual cases to apply their judicial faculties to the facts placed before them and weigh the same in order to decide whether that ephemeral threshold had been crossed which meant that the appellant had convincingly established sufficient cause for condonation of delay. It would be unwise and unadvisable to state for all times to come that what may or may not constitute a sufficient cause; each case ought to be decided on its own merits vis-à-vis the plea of sufficient cause.

For the purposes of determining whether in a given case sufficient cause had been made out when an appeal had been filed before a wrong forum, there did not seem to be any bar in law that the conditions or the limitation prescribed by section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1908 could not be looked into. However the conditions laid down in section 14 must be satisfied and established on the record.

Term sufficient cause had to be given the widest possible amplitude and in so doing the conditions/principles of section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1908 could not be left out.

(e) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)---

----Ss. 5 & 14---Institution or pendency of an appeal before a wrong forum i.e. one lacking jurisdiction, on the wrong advice of the counsel---Condonation of delay---Good faith and due diligence of appellant---Mistaken advice of counsel did not automatically and per se constitute a sufficient cause for condonation of delay as a matter of course and routine, rather, the appellant had to specify the reasons with clarity and precision which prevailed with the counsel and led him to commit the mistake and such application must also be supported by an affidavit---Mere incompetence of the counsel, inadvertence, negligence or ignorance of law attributable to him and/or overlooking of the record by the counsel could not constitute sufficient cause ipso facto, but the factor(s) which misled the legal counsel, including any ambiguity in the law, causing him to file the appeal before the wrong forum must be indicated---Appellant had to establish that due to some honest, bona fide and genuine ambiguity in the law or in fact, a party or his counsel was led astray in terms of approaching a wrong forum.

Question as to whether the institution and the pendency of the appeal on the wrong advice of the counsel before a wrong forum i.e. one lacking jurisdiction constituted a sufficient cause for condonation of delay in terms of section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908, it could neither be held that condonation was absolutely ruled out in such a situation nor that the appellant shall be entitled to condonation as a matter of course and right, rather the Court must look into the facts and circumstances of each case as to whether sufficient cause had been made out.

Person seeking condonation of delay must establish sufficient cause. Time spent pursuing an appeal before a wrong forum, in good faith and with due diligence ought to constitute sufficient cause for condonation of delay. But the act of approaching a wrong forum must be accounted for: it should be established that due to some honest, bona fide and genuine ambiguity in the law or in fact, a party or his counsel was led astray in terms of approaching a wrong forum. Mere incompetence of the counsel, inadvertence, negligence or ignorance of law attributable to him and/or overlooking of the record by the counsel could not constitute sufficient cause ipso facto, but the factor(s) which misled the legal counsel, including any ambiguity in the law, causing him to file the appeal before the wrong forum must be indicated. Mere wrong advice of counsel was not an adequate ground per se to constitute sufficient cause because if such rule was accepted, the rule that ignorance of law was no excuse would stand violated. Besides, the factors which caused ambiguity and misled the appellant (or his counsel as the case may be) had to be stated with clarity and precision in the application for condonation of delay and proved on the record.

Poor advice by a counsel may well cause hardship to a litigant and compromise his ability to seek redress in law. But hardship caused to a person on account of poor advice of counsel did not constitute a sufficient cause for condonation of delay per se. Courts must insist that applications for condonation of delay must specify with particularity as to what factors misled the counsel and gave him cause to form his unfortunate opinion with respect to the (wrong) forum adopted and thereafter the said factors must be proved on record. It is then for the court to decide if, on the basis of such factors, sufficient cause had been made out or not.

There may be instances where there was a different period of limitation applicable to different fora of appeal, and an appellant whose appeal was time barred before an appropriate forum may instead deliberately approach another forum (knowing it to be the wrong forum) in order to lay claim that time spent before a wrong forum ought to be condoned on account of the fact that appellant had approached it (forum) on the advice of counsel. All Courts must keep such considerations in mind when deciding whether or not delay caused by virtue of alleged wrong advice by counsel should be condoned.

(f) Administration of justice ---

----'Actus curiae neminem gravabit' ("an act of the court shall prejudice no man"), principle of---Scope---[Per Mian Saqib Nisar, J]: Said principle was founded upon justice and good sense, and afforded a safe and certain guide for the administration of law and justice; it was meant to promote and ensure that the ends of justice were met; it prescribed that no harm and injury to the rights and the interest of the litigants before the court shall be caused by the act or omission of the court---Said principle of administration of justice was meant for the benefit of both sides of litigants before the court and it would be illogical to conceive that the rule would or should be applied for the advantage of one litigant to the prejudice and disadvantage of the other---Court had the duty to act as a neutral arbiter between the parties and to provide justice to them through strict adherence to law and keeping in mind the facts of each case---[Per Ejaz Afzal Khan, J]: Principle of "actus curiae neminem gravabit" had been founded upon the principles of justice and good conscience---Rationale behind said principle was to undo the wrong or prejudice caused to a party by the act of the court---Said principle was applied to undo an injury or injustice caused to a party by an act of the court or by the laches or mistakes of its officers; it was also applied to restore what had been delayed or denied to a party by the act of the court or negligence of the persons manning and managing it.

Robert Mitchell. v. A. M. Overman (103 U.S. 64-65) ref.

(g) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)---

----Ss. 5 & 14---Appeal entertained by the staff of the court or the court itself which had no pecuniary jurisdiction---Appeal ultimately returned to the appellant or dismissed---Whether such appellant was protected from the bar of limitation and/or it constituted a sufficient cause for the condonation of delay---'Actus curiae neminem gravabit' ("an act of the court shall prejudice no man"), principle of---Applicability---Per Mian Saqib Nisar, J (Majority view): Principle of actus curiae neminem gravabit had no application where a litigant approached a wrong forum and such appeal was entertained by the staff of the court or by the court or even admitted to regular hearing---No condonation of delay could thus be availed by the appellant on the basis of said principle---Per Ejaz Afzal Khan, J (Minority view): If mistaken view of a counsel in filing an appeal or suit before the wrong forum could constitute a sufficient cause for the condonation of delay, it was not understandable why the same should not apply to a mistaken view of the court entertaining the appeal or the suit---Treating the two situations differently simply because one found expression in the act of the counsel and the other found expression in the act of the court would be unjust, unfair and unreasonable---Latter situation i.e. mistaken view of the court in entertaining the appeal or the suit deserved all the more allowance firstly because the court entertaining the appeal or the suit did not care to know that it laid outside its jurisdiction; secondly because it sat over it for months instead of returning it for being presented in the court of competent jurisdiction and thirdly because the appellant or the plaintiff went out of limitation on account of the said act of the Court---Excluding the principle of "actus curiae neminem gravabit" from the purview of Ss. 5 & 14 of the Limitation Act, 1908 would amount to excluding a vital part of the jurisprudence which had grown over centuries and earned recognition of the courts---Appellants going out of limitation on account of the act of the court were entitled to extension of time---His Lordship Ejaz Afzal Khan, J observed that the Clerk of the court while receiving appeal in the office and the District Judge hearing an appeal in motion shall ensure that it was presented in a competent forum and in case it was otherwise he shall immediately return it for being presented in the court of competent jurisdiction.

Consolidated Engineering Enterprises. v. Principal Secretary, Irrigation Department and others (2008) 7 SCC 167; J. Kumaradasan Nair and another v. IRIC Sohan and others AIR 2009 SC 1333; Rodger. v. The Comptoir d' Escompte de Paris (1871) 3 P.C. 465; Jai Berham and others v. Kedar Nath Marwari and others AIR 1922 PC 269; East Suffolk Rivers Catchment Board v. Kent and another 1941 AC 74; Pulteney v. Warren (1801) 6 Ves.73, 92; Parker v. Ellis 362 U.S. 574; Sough Eastern Coalfields Ltd. v. State of M. P. and others AIR 2003 SC 4482; Amarjeet Singh and others v. Devi Ratan and others AIR 2010 SC 3676; Hidayatullah v. Murad A. Khan PLD 1972 SC 69; Hari Ram v. Akbar Hussain ILR 29 All. 749; Rashad Ehsan and others v. Bashir Ahmad and another PLD 1989 SC 146; Sherin and 4 others v. Fazal Muhammad and 4 others 1995 SCMR 584; Syed Haji Abdul Wahid and another v. Syed Sirjuddin 1998 SCMR 2296; Karachi Electric Supply Corporation Ltd. v. Lawari and 4 others PLD 2000 SC 94 and Mst. Bas Khana and others v. Muhammad Raees Khan and others PLD 2005 Pesh. 214 ref.

Per Mian Saqib Nisar, J

(h) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)---

----Ss. 3 & 5---Discretion exercised by the courts below in condoning delay---Interference by higher forum---Principles---Discretion exercised by a court below was not open to interference by a higher court unless it had been exercised arbitrarily---In the exercise of its discretionary power the court (below) was not empowered to act upon whim and caprice, rather the discretion of the court was circumscribed by the law, recognized norms of justice, fairplay, equity, logic, rationality and reasonableness---Where the court (below) had passed an order in exercise of its discretion by condoning the delay, on the basis of sufficient cause which had been made out, it did not behove a superior court to interfere in the matter---However where the exercise of discretion was unbridled, arbitrary and perverse, it did not render it immune to the scrutiny and correction by the superior court---Where no sufficient cause on record had been made out yet the discretion for the condonation of delay was exercised subjectively and whimsically (by the lower court) it was the duty of the superior court to rectify the defect in the exercise of discretion---Such duty was duly mandated by the provisions of S.3 of the Limitation Act, 1908.

Muhammad Bashir v. Province of Punjab through Collector of District Gujrat and others 2003 SCMR 83 and The Province of East Pakistan v. Muhammad Hossain Mia PLD 1965 SC 1 ref.

(i) Punjab Pre-emption Act (I of 1913) [since repealed]

----S. 21---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Ss. 5 & 14---Suit for pre-emption---Appeal filed by counsel before the wrong forum i.e. one lacking pecuniary jurisdiction---Whether lack of pecuniary jurisdiction by court sufficient cause for condonation of delay---No reason existed for the counsel of the appellant (pre-emptor) whilst filing the appeal, to be misled by any fact or the law because the jurisdictional value was clearly mentioned in the plaint by the pre-emptor---Such value was also clearly reflected in the decree passed by the Trial Court, whereby the suit of the pre-emptor was dismissed---Appeal should thus have not been filed before the District Court, but before the High Court, as at the relevant point of time, it was the High Court which had the pecuniary jurisdiction to hear the appeal on account of the jurisdictional value fixed in the plaint and decree sheet---Record showed that an objection was raised by the vendees/defendants about the incorrect valuation and that was the most opportune moment for the pre-emptor having been put to notice about his so-called inadvertent incorrect valuation to ratify the said mistake but instead the pre-emptor joined the issue---No attempt was ever made by the pre-emptor during the course of trial to correct the valuation by seeking an amendment in the plaint---Trial Court retained the value of the suit filed by the pre-emptor, which valuation squarely and duly appeared in the decree sheet; it was thus on the basis of the valuation of the suit fixed by the pre-emptor in the plaint itself and reflected in the decree which had to determine the forum of appeal---At the time of passing the decree there was no ambiguity which could mislead the pre-emptor's counsel into filing the appeal before the District Court---Inadvertence, negligence, mistake simpliciter (albeit bona fide) etc. of the counsel did not constitute a sufficient cause for condonation of delay---Pre-emptor had not been able to make out a case beyond mere inadvertence---In the present case, condonation of delay had been granted to the pre-emptor by both the courts below on the basis of arbitrary and whimsical reasons---Such exercise of discretion being against settled principles could always be interfered with---Supreme Court dismissed the appeal of the pre-emptor before the District Court for being barred by time.

(j) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)---

----Ss. 8 & 42---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Ss. 5 & 14 --- Suit for declaration and possession---Appeal filed by counsel before the wrong forum i.e. one lacking pecuniary jurisdiction---Whether sufficient cause for condonation of delay---Contention of appellant that due to the inadvertent mistake of his counsel the appeal had been filed before the District Court (wrong forum) instead of the High Court---Validity---Such mistaken advice of a counsel, even if unintentional, simpliciter did not constitute a sufficient cause in terms of S. 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908, instead there had to be cogent reasons, clearly spelt out and proved on the record, for such purpose---Mere pendency of an appeal before the wrong forum especially when no sufficient cause had been made out shall not be a ground per se or simpliciter for condonation of delay---Application for condonation of delay filed in the present case contained a mere narration of the facts leading up to the filing of the appeal before the wrong forum (District Court), and there were no plausible reasons or justifications given for the filing of such appeal before the wrong forum, apart from a feeble assertion that "the delay for filing the Regular First Appeal was not intentional" on the part of the appellant---Besides case record showed that the memorandum of appeal was ordered to be returned on 23.6.1994 but the appellant never approached the District Court (wrong forum) for receiving the same within reasonable time rather, after considerable lapse of time of about 18 months, it was received on 2.1.1996---No explanation was provided for such delay, i.e. 18 months and 10 days---Appellant had never claimed that after the order of return of the memorandum of appeal he approached the District Court (wrong forum) promptly and it was the (District) Court which delayed the return of the memorandum of appeal ---No sufficient cause for delay in filing the appeal had been made out in the present case---Appeal was dismissed accordingly.

(k) Limitation Act (IX of 1908) ---

----Ss. 5 & 14---Appeal, filing of---Condonation of delay---Sufficient cause---Appellant correctly filing appeal before the High Court---High Court returning the appeal and compelling appellant to file his appeal before the District Court (wrong forum), which under law had no jurisdiction---Such order of the High Court was bad in law---Appellant was a victim of an act of the court, which was sufficient cause for condoning delay in filing the appeal.

Pre-emptor, in the present case, had valued the suit property at Rs.500,000 in the plaint and specifically mentioned the said amount as the value of the suit for the purposes of court fee and pecuniary jurisdiction. Such valuation was categorically denied by the vendee through her written statement asserting it to be Rs.2,500,000. In light of such divergent pleas the Trial Court framed an issue in that "What is the market value of the suit property?". On the said issue Trial Court fixed Rs.25,00,000/- as market value of the suit property. Keeping in view such finding of the trial court, which determination was duly reflected in the decree sheet as well, the vendee (appellant) filed an appeal before the High Court, instead of the District Court. High Court ordered return of appeal for filing the same before the proper forum on the basis that valuation of suit for the purpose of court fee and jurisdiction was given as Rs.500,000 in the plaint.

Vendee was justified in considering that the value of the suit for the purposes of jurisdiction had been changed/modified (from Rs.500,000 to Rs.25,00,000) by the trial court, thus leading him to prefer an appeal before the High Court. High Court remained oblivious that in a suit for pre-emption of a house (urban property) the value of the suit for the purposes of jurisdiction was the sale consideration of the suit property; thus as per the finding of the trial court, when it was held that the sale consideration was Rs.2,500,000/- this modified the jurisdictional value automatically.

The market value of the suit property at Rs.2,500,000/- had been clearly indicated in the decree sheet prepared by the trial court, thus for all intents and purposes the said amount became the changed value for the purposes of jurisdiction of the forum of appeal. Vendee had rightly filed the appeal before the High Court and the order of the High Court returning the appeal was bad in law. In such manner the vendee had been compelled to file his appeal before the District Court (wrong forum) which had no jurisdiction on account of the increase in the sale price of the property by the trial court. Vendee was a victim of the act of the court which was sufficient cause for condonation of delay in filing his appeal.

(l) Interpretation of statutes--

----Law of limitation---Salient features of interpretation of law of limitation enumerated.

P L D 2016 Supreme Court 872

Present: Anwar Zaheer Jamali,. C.J., Mian Saqib Nisar, Ejaz Afzal Khan, Mushir Alam and Manzoor Ahmad Malik, JJ

KHUSHI MUHAMMAD through L.Rs. and others---Appellants

Versus

Mst. FAZAL BIBI and others---Respondents

Per Mian Saqib Nisar, J; Anwar Zaheer Jamali, C J, Mushir Alam and Manzoor Ahmad Malik, JJ agreeing; Ejaz Afzal Khan, J disagreeing only with the finding that "principle of actus curiae neminem gravabit had no application where a litigant approached a wrong forum and such appeal was entertained by the staff of the court or by the court or even admitted to regular hearing."

PLD 2015 LAHORE 336
Adopted child to be maintained by adopting father as a constructive guardian.

after ex parte decree in family suit........ Notice to Defendant.....
under section 9(7) family courts act 1964,,, it is incumbent upon family court after passing ex parte decree must send ex parte decree Notice to the defendant ,,,,,--
and under 9 sub section (6) defendant will have to appear with in 30 days and satisfy court with sufficient cause of his non appearance,,,,
if court satisfied, then the ex parte decree will be set aside, and new proceedings shall be initiated

2000 SCMR 296.
Where civil suit was decreed ex parte,various remedies available to aggrieved person were,firstly filling application U/O 9,R 13.CPC secondly,applicatiin U/S 96(2)CPC,thirdly, petition for review U/S 114,read with O 47CPC and fourthly,petition U/S 12(2) CPC petitioner having exhausted remedy by filling an application U/O 9 R 13, CPC, she could not be permitted to reagitate same issue by means of fresh petition U/S 12(2)CPC

2012 SCMR..242.
ENTRY MADE IN RECORD OF NADARA MAY NOT BE A CONCLUSIVE PROOF OF AGE.

SCMR.2012. (280)
SECTION..11, ORDER.VII,
RULES. 1 (G) AND 8...C.P.C.
Constructive red judicata...
Failure of a party to ask for all relief to which he was entitled...Effect...Such relief, even if available and not asked for, could not be claimed by filing a subsequent legal proceedings as same would fall within mischief of constructive res judicata