Sunday, 5 February 2017

IMPORTANT CASE LAWS OF 2015

IMPORTANT CASE LAWS OF 2015
(PLD,SCMR,P.CR.R.)
PLD 2015 SC 242
PLD 2015 SC 66
PLD 2015 SC 250
Filing of private complainant is no ground to grant bail in state case even the proceeding has been stopped in state case.
2015 SCMR 1077
Sentencing policy of Narcotics is not relevant at bail stage.
2015 SCMR 735
If the quantity of Narcotics is more than one K.G but less the 10 k.G, punishment should be for a period of greater than seven years to anything less than fourteen years
2015 SCMR 56
If the accused is summoned to face trial in private complaint, court required to direct him to execute bound for his appearance.
2015 SCMR 423
No one should be convicted and sentenced to death on a capital charge merely if he plead guilty to the charge but some evidence must be recorded in support for conviction.
2015 SCMR 1142
2015 P.Cr.R 99
Rule of consistency should be fallowed in final decision of the case in conviction or acquittal.
2015 SCMR 1570
Convict/accused should be surrendered for imprisonment before filing of appeal and suspension.
PLD 2015 SC 15
Section 35 & 397 Cr.P.C conviction of several offences at one trial or different trial. How run?
PLD 2015 SC 41
Second bail application needs fresh ground if earlier was withdrawn after arguments at some length. (reliance PLD 2014 SC 241)
PLD 2015 SC 145
Principle of falsus in uno falsus omnibus is not applicable in Pakistan
PLD 2015 SC 77
Implementation of Qisas & Deyat in Murder case. (Detail judgment on section 299, 302,304,306,307,308.311 PPC)
PLD 2015 SC 50
PLD 2015 SC 145
Principle of expectancy of life in no ground to convert death sentence into life imprisonment if delay is caused in execution.
PLD 2015 Lah 272(M)
Right of fair trial under Article 10-A of Constitution. Basic Ingredients.
PLD 2015 Lah 213
Exhumation without the consent of legal heirs/family is not allowed.
PLD 2015 Lah 93
Taking of cognizance is not commencement of trial, it commences when the charge framed.
PLD 2015 Lah 1
Appeal filed by the accused who had absconded after suspension of his sentence, could be decided on merits by the appellate court even in his absence.
PLD 2015 Lah 426
Conviction could be based on the testimony of single witness even in murder case.
PLD 2015 Lah 512
Section 544-A of Cr.P.C qualifying victim of rape or sodomy to entitle for compensation.
PLD 2015 Lah 84
Deletion or insertion of any offence falls within the exclusive domain of the investigation police agency and District Public Prosecutor.
PLD 2015 Lah 231
Information through SMS is validly accepted U/A 73 & 164 QSO.
2015 P.Cr.R 1249
Deyat of prevailing year is applicable when the decision is passed.
2015 P.Cr.R 721
There is no provision of law which required the sending the whole recovered narcotics for chemical analysis.
PLD 2015 Isl 85 (e)
2015 P.Cr.R 230
Prosecution is not bound to produce all witnesses. Material and nature witnesses are sufficient.
PLD 2015 Isl 85 (c)
Press clipping could be considered and looked into as corroborated material in the presence of some other direct impeachable and confidence inspiring evidence but their own strength, press clipping were not enough to prove the existence of certain fact.

Saturday, 4 February 2017

AGE ..medical


AGE .................
* Civil servant has to go to Service Tribunal for correction in his date of birth. 2015 SCMR 456, 2014 MLD 440
* Opinion not based on ossifications test by doctor, held opinion rightly rejected. (DB) PLD 1977 Kar. 75 Mohammad Saleem .
* Opinion not supported by reliable evidence carries no value. PLD 1951 BJ 7 Ghulam Qadir v. Noor Ahmad.
* "The doctor's certificate which is only an assertion of opinion and the minor's declaration before the Magistrate as to age is no proof of age. (PC) AIR 1916 PC 242 followed in PLD 1952 BJ 15 Dittoo v. Crown. AIR 1928 Lah. 250 AIR 1939 All. 708.
* Medical certificate about age given preference over certificate issued by Cantonment Board. Medical Certificate gives a margin of one year either way. PLD 1988 Kar. 142, Jamshed v. Agha Suhail, etc.
* Age of accused. Best evidence is that of radiologist. Preference cannot be given to school leaving certificate on ground of that being more beneficial to the accused. (DB) PLD 1966 Pesh. 97 Hassan v. Bashir Ahmad.
* Proof. Evidence of radiologist is to be preferred to School Certificate. (DB) PLD 1972 Pesh. 27 Iftikhar.
* Ossification test. Age of victim girl determined by ossification test, held test not very much advanced in fixation of girl's age with accuracy. (DB) 1968 P.Cr.L.J. 529 Rajat Kundan.
* "Though a better guide to the age of a person yet it is not an accurate estimate. Margin of one year on either side possible. (DB) 1975 P.Cr.LJ 936 Yousaf.
* X-ray test for age is more accurate than other clinical means. 1975 P.Cr.LJ 1227 Abdul Rahim.
* On clinical and radiological examination the doctor opined the age of prosecutrix between 15 and 16 years. Held estimate of age on such considerations not always correct. PLJ 1975 Cr. C. (Kar.) 511 Banney Khan.
* X-ray ossification test. X-ray report and ossification test do not establish age with certainty or exactitude. Various factors control ossification. Estimate of age on radiological examination fixing gril's age between 15 and 16 year

Case Law, Bail Anti Corrution


Case Law, Bail Anti Corrution
Citation Name : 2002 YLR 2764 KARACHI-HIGH-COURT-SINDH
Side Appellant : UMAR DIN LODHI
Side Opponent : THE STATE
----S.498---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 409/420/467/468/471-A/34 --- Prevention of corruption Act (II of 1947), S.5(2)---Pre-arrest bail ---Offences pertained to the years 1992 to 1996 and the accused was posted as ADM in the year 1995, hence the whole of the period shown in the F.I.R. could not be put to his account---Act of the accused relating to his period of posting was found in the two departmental inquiries conducted against him to be an irregularity in drawing the Government funds in excess to the sanctioned amount and not an embezzlement of the same---Investigation was complete and the challan had been submitted in the Court--Accused who was a retired Government servant was no more required for any further investigation---Involvement of huge amount in the case could not be made a ground for refusing the bail ---Two co-accused had already been granted bail ---Accused had pleaded mala fides on the part of the anti corruption Police at the behest of the complainant due to his personal ill-will--Record and all documents being in the possession of the prosecution, there was no chance of tampering with the evidence--Accused had not misused the concession of interim pre-arrest bail granted to him more than one and a half years back and the same was confirmed in circumstances.
Citation Name : 2002 MLD 1659 KARACHI-HIGH-COURT-SINDH
Side Appellant : WASI HAIDER
Side Opponent : THE STATE
Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C) ----S. 497(2)'---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss.409, 420, 468, 471, 477-A, 109 & 34---Prevention of corruption Act (II of 1947), S.5(2)--bail , grant of---Further inquiry---Amount involved in case though was substanti al but that fact by itself would be no ground for refusing bail to accused especially when that huge amount was encashed during tenure of other officer---Case of accused was identical with case of co-accused who had been released on bail ---Rule of consistency demand that bail concession was also granted to accused as bail could not be withheld as a punishment to accused---Investigation had already been completed and accused were no, more required for investigation and it was a rule in matter of grant of bail in such cases to grant the bail and to refuse was an exception---Case being fit for further inquiry, accused were admitted to bail .
Citation Name : 2002 MLD 746 KARACHI-HIGH-COURT-SINDH
Side Appellant : BASHIR AHMED
Side Opponent : THE STATE
Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C) ----Ss. 561-A & 497---Sindh Inquiry an anti -corruption Act (IV of 1991), Preamble, Ss.3, 9) & 11---conversion of application under S.497, Cr.P.C. into the one under S.561-A, Cr.P.C. Quashing , of F.I.R.---F.I.R. containing allegations of corruption and misconduct was directly lodged with the police station by a police officer against the accused who was a civil servant despite an anti -corruption police station was available in the locality---In terms of S.3 of Sindh Enquiry and anti -corruption Act, 1991 only the anti -corruption Department had jurisdiction to enquire into allegation of corruption against a civil servant---Preamble of the Act had also provided for the constitution of a special agency for investigation of offences relating to corruption by or inquiry into misconduct of public servant---F.I.R. lodged by Police Authorities against the accused who was a public servant, suffered from a basic legal defect and it was totally without jurisdiction while competent anti -corruption Police Station was available in the locality---Court converted application of bail into an application under S.561-A, Cr.P.C. and quashed the F.I.R. with direction to Police Authorities to adopt the proper procedure as provided under Sindh Inquiry and anti -corruption Act, 1991.

Case laws on TALAQ


Case laws on TALAQ
1996 MLD 1689. Zubaida Khatoon V/S Administrator Union Council Uch Gillani (Lah.)
S.7. Talaq pronounced by husband to wife thrice …. Right of revocation by husband……. Legality …. Withdrawal of notice of talaq by husband from Administrator, Union Council…. Validity …. Talaq pronounced by husband to wife thrice would become “Bain” and husband would have no right of its revocation as per injunctions laid down in Holy Quran and Sunnah, relating to divorce and its revocation and to that extent provisions of S.7 Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, would give its way to those injunctions as enshrined in the constitution.
1998 MLD 486. Mst. Rehmat Ara V/S Mehmoodul Hassan & another (Lah.)
S.7. Husband asserted that period of “Iddat” of 90 days must be counted from date of issuance of notice to Arbitration Council and not from the date of pronouncement of Talaq. Commencement of period “Iddat”… Talaq was validly given by husband on 9-6-1996 when the same was pronounced and period of “Iddat” of three months had expired on 9-9-1996 and talaq became final on said date. Withdrawal of talaq by husband on 21-10-1996 (after it had become final) was inconsequential and ineffective.
1998 MLD 85. Farah Khan V/S Tahir Hamid Khan & another (Lah.)
Marriage between petitioner and respondent was solemnized in accordance with provisions of Muslim Family Law Ordinance, 1961 in Pakistan. Respondent divorced petitioner which was endorsed by Arbitration Council. Validity. Originally both petitioner and respondent were Pakistani citizens and after three years of marriage only respondent had acquired citizenship of USA. Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, would extend to whole of Pakistan and applied to all muslim citizens of Pakistan wherever they might be in terms of S.(2) of the Ordinance. Provisions of Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, could be invoked where one of the party to marriage was Muslim citizen of Pakistan. Even if it was presumed that Arbitration council had no jurisdiction to entertain notice of talaq given by respondent under provisions of S.7 Muslim Family Law Ordinance, 1961, right of talaq vested in husband under Sharia had not been taken away from any Muslim, irrespective of the country to which he belonged. Despite restrictions contained in Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, husband’s right of talaq would prevail as given to him under Quranic injunctions. Divorce pronounced by respondent had, thus, taken effect under Islamic injunctions even if notice to Arbitration council intimating such talaq or subsequent proceedings taken in that regard and certificate issued by Arbitration council endorsing effectiveness of talaq, were ignored. Constitutional petition also suffered from laches which would not warrant interference by High court at such belated stage when talaq under Sharia had already become effective.
1998 MLD 1216. Abdullah V/S Mst. Shaheen & 2 Others (Pesh.DB)
S.2(v). Proviso ©. Dissolution of marriage on ground of impotency of husband. Decree for dissolution of marriage was granted to wife by Family Court on ground of impotency of husband on only evidence furnished by Lady Doctor to the effect that hymen of the wife being intact, she was a virgin. According to settled medical and scientific phenomenon, factum of hymen being intact, was not a conclusive proof of virginity because hymen in certain cases is so flexible that it is not repertured by incideence of first delivery. Evidence on record indicated that husband and wife had tried to produce their own medical certificates by consulting Doctors themselves, but court had not referred same for examination which had shown touch of personal involvement of court. Better approach would have been to get the parties medically examined through court. Application filed by husband under proviso © of S.2(v) of Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939, was also not considered by Family Court before passing decree for dissolution of marriage on ground of impotency of husband. Family Court had acted without jursidiction and also had exercised jurisdiction not vested in it as Family Court could not pass decree for dissolution of marriage on the ground of impotency of husband, unless on application of husband, he was required to satisfy the court within one year from the date of such order that he had ceased to be impotent. If husband so satisfies the court within such period qua the same woman involved, no decree for dissolution of marriage would be passed on ground of impotency. Judgement of Family Court was set aside and case was remanded to be decided afresh after complying with provisions of proviso © of S.2(v) of Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939.
NLR 2002 SD 161. Mst. Ambreen Shah V/S Chairman Union Council etc. (Lahore)
Pronouncement of triple talaq by husband. According to verse 230 of Surah Baqra of the Holy Quran, talaq becomes irrevocable. Husband cannot subsequently revoke such talaq.
PLD 2002 Lahore 518. Hamid Hameed Waris V/S Mrs. Tehseen
Divorce. If a husband announces divorce thrice to his wife, same becomes operative according to Hanafi Sect. (2) S.2(ix). Suit for dissolution of marriage. Oral pronouncement of divorce by husband to his wife. Husband not reducing such divorce in writing. Remedy of wife to get confirmed such oral divorce. Wife in such circumstances had no other option, but to approach the Court.
PLD 2003 Peshawar 169.Fazli-e-Subhan V/S Sabereen & 3 Others (DB)
S.7 & 8. Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961. Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 had abolished the practice of disapproved form of :Talaq" and mode prescribed in the ordinance was that of a "Talaq-e-Ahsan" and by the ordinance it had been made mandatory that the notice of "Talaq" would be effected only if efforts of reconciliation would fail. Law prevailing previous to the enforcement of Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 had made it obligatory for the couples divorced by any mode of "Talaq" other than "Talaq-e-Ahsan" not to re-marry each other again, unless wife married another man who died or divorced her after actual consummation and she married her first husband after period of "Iddat". Before re-marriage parties had to prove that bar to their marriage was removed by intermediate marriage, consummation and dissolution, otherwise their marriage was not considered valid. Mode of "Talaq" effected under provisions of the 1961 Ordinance being almost that of "Talaq-e-Ahsan, the couples could re-marry without any intervening marriage except where they had been divorced thrice and the third divorce had become effective and in that case they could not re-marry without an intervening marriage. Plain reading of S.7 of the 1961 Ordinance, though had implied that all kinds of "Talaq" had been made revocable without an intervening marriage and could be that its repugnancy to such extent could validly be agitated on the touchstone of Quranic behest and the traditions of Holy Prophet (p.b..u.h.) but neither vires of said S.7 had been challenged nor matter raised in case pertained to all kinds of "Talaqs"-- Matter, in the present case, pertained to "Talaq" obtained by wife through Court decree in shape of Khula".
NLR 2004 SD 190. Shoukat Ali & another V/S The State (FSC).
S.10 Zina Ord. S.7(I) Muslim F.L.Ord.1961, Talaq pronounced by husband in accordance with requirements of Shariah without following the procedure laid down in S.7 would be valid pronouncement of Talaq. Failure to follow procedure laid down in S.7 may entail punishment but would not invalidate Talaq which is conscious and willful pronouncement of Talaq with intention to release wife from marriage bond. CONVICTION SET-ASIDE.
PLD 2004 Lahore 77.Mst. Nazir Fatima Nazim Union Council
S.5 & Schedule Family Courts Act 1964. One of the conditions of the marriage between parties was that husband had delegated the right do divorce wife and try to that effect was made in column No.18 of Nikahnama. Wife in exercise of said right pronounced divorce upon herslef for her husband and a notice was sent to Nazim Union Council concerned. Nazim had intimated wife that husband being not ready to pronounce divorce, wife could approach the court as he could not grant Khula and Nazim sent the case to the Family Court. Nazim was oblivious of legal position as right of divorce could be lawfully delegated by husband to wife and that had happened in the present case and notice was sent by wife in compliance with the terms of S. 7 & 8 of Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961. Ninety days prescribed period having expired after receipt of notice issued by wife and reconciliation being not possible between the parties, law as prescribed in S.7(3) & 8 of Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 would have in course. Nazim would issue requisite document regarding receipt of notice and failure of reconciliation within prescribed time.
PLD 2004 Lahore 316. Mian Arif Mehmood V/S Mst. Tanvir Fatima & another
S.7(3) & (5) Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961. Divorce pronounced by the husband upon the wife having not been revoked, had become effective after the expiry of ninety days from the date of receipt of notice by the Nazim/Chairman Arbitration Council in view of S.7(3). PETITION PARTLY ALLOWED.
PLD 2004 Lahore 588.Nasrullah V/S District Judge Mianwali
S.5 West Pakistan Family Courts Act 1964 & Schedule. Suit for recovery of value of dowry articles and compensation for divorce. Suit for recovery of compensation for divorce filed by wife was resisted by husband on ground that Family Court had no jurisdiction to grant that relief. Husband had claimed that he had divorced the lady because of her bad character. Evidence on record had shown that husband had made false accusation against the lady as he had no evidence to offer for the same. No particulars were given as to how he had accused the lady to be of a bad character. Divorce, in circumstances was pronounced by husband wtihout giving any reason against the lady. Schedule appended to West Pakistan Family Courts Act was amended and item No.9 was added to the effect "Personal property and belonging of a wife" which by all means vested the lady with a right to bring an action against the husband to claim compensation for divorce pronounced upon her without any justification. Husband became indebted to the lady in the said amount and moment said condition became operative. Even if such debt was conditional or contingent, would fall within the meaning of actionable claim. Claim of the lady to said amount accruing to her upon an unjustified divorce, by all means was a property and fell within item 9 of Schedule read with S.5 of West Pakistan Family Act, 1964. Appellate court, in circumstances had not acted without lawful authority while decreeing said claim of respondent. PETITION DISMISSED.
PLD 2006 SC 457.Mst. Farah Naz V/S Judge Family Court Sahiwal
S.5 Family Courts Act, 1964. Plea of oral divorce. Validity. Husband was required to send notice of divorce to Arbitration Council under Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 and also to send copy of such notice to wife by registered post. No such proceedings having been ever conducted, oral allegation of Talaq would neither be effective nor valid and binding on wife, who was legally entitled to past maintenance.
PLJ 2008 Sh.C.(AJK) 55. Bilal Hamza Abbasi V/S Wazir Muhammad & another
Specific mode for dissolution of marriage --- Divorce pronounced on telephonic call. Islam does not prescribe any specific mode for dissolution of marriage. It is an overt act on the part of husband which could indicate a clear intention to annul the marriage to operate as a divorce. No particular form of words is prescribed for affecting a talaq. If the words of Talaq are clear express and very well understood as implying divorce, no proof of intention is required. It is also not necessary that divorce should be pronounced in the presence of wife or even addressed to her. Witness for the respondent told him that appellant tried to hand over the divorce deed to him but he refused to receive the same. Held: Appellant had pronounced talaq through telephonic call by producing cogent, sufficient and reliable evidence. No any non-reading or misreading of the evidence on the part of Family Court. APPEAL DISMISSED.
2009 MLD 1478. Ambreen Afshan V/S Mrs. Idrees Qazu (Lahore)
S.7 Muslim Family Laws Ord. 1961. Divorce--Effectiveness---Husband administered the divorce and notified the same to Chairman of Arbitration/Union Council whereupon certain proceedings were taken and ultimately a certificate for the effectiveness of divorce was issued through the impugned order. Wife was well aware of the fact that husband had pronounced divorce to her for which consequential proceedings before the Arbitration/Union Council had also been taken. Father of the wife had been pursuing the matter before Arbitration Council. Case of the wife who had challenged effectiveness of the divorce was that the submission of divorce deed with a notice before the Arbitration Council could not ipso facto, operate and result into the dissolution of marriage. In the present case it could not be disputed that the period much beyond 90 days had expired from the date of notice of the divorce when impugned certificate of its effectiveness was issued, in the circumstances, especially keeping in view all the relevant facts of service of notice on the Chairman Union Council, the initiation of the proceedings by the Arbitration Council, the repeated appearance of father of the wife who was holding a power of attorney on her behalf in those proceedings and actual knowledge of the wife about the pendency and fact of those proceedings, divorce and its pronouncement had become effective. Failure to send a notice to the Chairman of the Arbitration Council would not render the divorce in-effective in Shariah. Effect of pronouncement of divorce in Shariah would not justify interference with impugned order nor would warrant exercise of discretion in favor of the petitioner/wife under Art.199 of the Constitution.

Saturday, 7 January 2017

1: Suspension of Sentence/Bails









News Feed


APPEAL
1: Suspension of Sentence/Bails
2007 SCMR 1844.
S.124-A/131/109/505(a)/468/471/469/500 PPC. Plea of convict was that necessary sanction of government had not been obtained for purpose of taking cognizance of offence U/S 124-A PPC and that he had already undergone all sentences except sentences U/S 131/109 PPC., which would stand served out, if remissions granted under law from time to time were credited to him........ Validity........ Sentences awarded to convict would stand undergone while crediting to him remission granted under law. Not a single hearing had taken place in appeal, provisions of S.426(3) CrPC would come in operation and period of suspension of sentence would stand excluded and convict would have to undergo sentence awarded to him by court. SENTENCES SUSPENDED.
1995 PCrLJ 490. Abdul Aziz V/S The State (Lahore).
S.302/447 PPC. Benefit created by the legislature must be given to the convict as a matter of right and not as a matter of discretion whose appeal has not been heard according to the classification given in clauses (a), (b) & (c) of Sub-section 1-A of S.426 CrPC unless by his conduct he deprives himself of the said benefit. BAIL GRANTED
PLD 1995 SC 576. Sajjad Bashir V/S The State .
S.302 PPC. S.426(1-A)(c) & 439 CrPC. Accused appealed against his conviction and released on bail by High Court. Complainant filed revision petition for enhancement of sentence. Held: Even if High Court, after hearing complainant’s counsel in revision petition, was of such view, the proper course open to the High Court was to have summoned the appeal file and served notice on the accused to show cause why his bail was not to be recalled and then after hearing him, to pass a legal order. High Court’s order cancelling bail of accused being illegal was consequently set aside and he was directed to be released from jail to remain on bail in compliance with the earlier bail order of High Court passed in his appeal BAIL CANCELLATION ORDER RECALLED
NLR 1997 SD 369. Mazhar @ Mazhari etc. V/S The State (Bahawalpur DB).
S.426(1) CrPC. Right given to convict by S/426(1) cannot be denied to him when there is no fault on his part in disposal of his appeal within statutory period. Appellate Court U/S 426(1) shall, unless for reasons to be recorded in writing it otherwise directs, order a convict to be released on bail U/S 426(1). Plea that convict had acted in a cruel manner in causing injuries would be no ground to withhold right U/S 426(1) CrPC. BAIL GRANTED
NLR 1996 CrLJ 179 Muhammad Zahid V/S The State (Multan).
S.426(1)(c) CrPC S.302/34 PPC. Convict whose appeal has not been decided in two years is entitled to suspension of sentence of life imprisonment. SENTENCE SUSPENDED/BAIL GRANTED
PLD 1996 Lahore 466 Manzoor Ahmed V/S The State.
S.426(1)(c) CrPC. S.302(b)/452 PPC. Accused on account of his continuous detention exceeding two years after his conviction whose appeal had not been fixed for hearing and disposed of so far had secured the legal point and had become entitled to derive the legal benefit thereof. SENTENCE SUSPENDED/BAIL GRANTED
1998 PCrLJ 245 Nawaz Kahn V/S The State (Lahore).
S.302(b) PPC. Earlier application of accused for suspension of sentence dismissed on merits could not stand in the way of High Court to adjudicate upon his present application for suspension of sentence on the statutory ground. Appeal of accused notwithstanding the expiry of the statutory period of two years was not likely to be fixed for hearing in near future. SENTENCE SUSPENDED/BAIL GRANTED
2000 MLD 140. Gulzar & 2 Others V/S The State (Lahore DB).
S.302/34 PPC. S.426 CrPC. Suspension of sentence was sought on ground that no overt act was ascribed to convicts as deceased had fallen a prey to co-convict’s gunshot and that statutory period prescribed by S.426 had lapsed. Contention of convicts remained uncontroverted from prosecution side. CONVICTION SUSPENDED
2001 MLD 1335. Muhammad Mustafa V/S The State (Lahore DB).
S.302/34 PPC. S.426(1-A) CrPC. Tentative assessment of such material prima facie had shown that the accused had acted in a manner which had reflected that he was hard-hearted, callous and of a desperate character. If the appeal of an accused who was sentenced to life imprisonment or imprisonment exceeding seven years had not been decided within a period of two years of his conviction, the Appellate Court though could release him on bail, but court could refuse to release him on bail for “reasons to be recorded in writing”. Court while refusing to suspend the sentence on statutory ground was not supposed to touch the merits of the case, but Court could “take into consideration the evidence collected for purpose of determining whether the accused was a criminal of the categories prescribed in S.426(1-A CrPC”. SENTENCE NOT SUSPENDED
NLR 2002 CrLJ 328. Said Wali V/S Haji Nazir Gul (Peshawar DB).
S.426(1-A) CrPC. Convict seeking suspension of sentence cannot make any mileage from use of word “shall” in S.426(1A) as words “for reasons to be recorded by it in writing” appearing after the word “shall” leave no room for doubt that discretion of Appellate Court has not been taken away. Appellate Court is still vested U/S 426(1A) with discretion to decline suspension of sentence in delay related appeal after recording reasons. (2) S.426(1A). Disposal related delay in deciding appeal against conviction does not create any right for convict for suspension of his sentence. (3) Huge backlog, horrendous increase in litigation and present working strength of High Court are the causes of not disposal of appeals against conviction within prescribed time. Such delay would be no ground for suspension of sentence of convict. CONVICTION NOT SUSPENDED
2003 SCMR 407. Adil Bashir V/S The State (SC.DB)
S.302 PPC. S.426 CrPC. Suspension of sentence - Appreciation of evidence - While dilating upon and deciding an application U/S 426 CrPC, appraisal of evidence in depth is neither warranted nor desirable. Court in this regard should confine itself to the judgment assailed before it giving due consideration and weight to the reasonable and legal views expressed by the trial court but all attempts should be made neither to reappraise the evidence nor to enter into the merits of the case. LEAVE REFUSED.
2004 MLD 1883. Nawaz Ahmad & 4 Others V/S The State (Lahore)
S.302/34 PPC. Accused had not caused any injury to any of deceased and accused had only been saddled with responsibility of causing a fire-arm injury on the neck of prosecution witness, but that prosecution witness was not produced before trial court as a witness and had been given up by prosecution as having been won over. Trial court had itself concluded that it was a case of a sudden occurrence without any premediation. Six accused persons had themselves received injuries during said incident which injuries had been completely suppressed in FIR and had not been explained by prosecution before trial court. Question regarding sharing of common object by accused with his co-accused as also the question regarding his vicarious liability for the offences allegedly committed by his co-accused, in peculiar circumstances, were questions which would require serious consideration at the time of hearing of appeal. BAIL GRANTED/SENT. SUSPENDED.
PLD 2004 Lahore 79. Muhammad Shahid Farooq @ Shahda V/S The State (DB)
S.302/34/109/148/149 PPC. Accused had not caused any injury to any person during the alleged occurrence and he stood saddled with responsibility of indulging in in ineffective firing only. Nothing had been recovered from possession of accused during investigation. I.O. had found that accused was not armed with any weapon during the occurrence. Accused had already spent more than two years in jail in connection with the case. Question regarding sharing of common intention by the accused with his co-accused also question regarding his vicarious liability for the offence allegedly committed by his co-accused were questions which would require serious re-consideration at the time of hearing of main appeal. SENT. SUSPENDED/BAIL GRANTED.
2004 SCMR 12. Amjad Hassan Gurchani V/S Sajjad Haider Khan & another (SC.DB)
S.302(b)/34 PPC. Suspension of sentence. Power of High Court. During the pendency of appeal High Court cannot release a convict on bail in view of the exclusion of application of S.426 CrPC by S.7(1) of the STA (Special Courts) Act 1975. High Court can only exercise its jurisdiction U/S 561-A CrPC in the cases of hardship, such as pendency of appeal of convict for a number of years either on account of delaying tactics on the part of the prosecution agency or because of heavy work load of the court and also if accused was suffering from ailment of the nature detrimental to life. BAIL GRANTED
2004 SCMR 1153.Khalid Hussain V/S Abdul Razzaq (SC.DB)
S.302(b) PPC. S.426 CrPC. High Court through the impugned order had suspended the sentence of imprisonment for life awarded to accused U/S 302(b) PPC. Accused had neither caused any injury to the deceased nor to any prosecution witness and he himself had received two serious sharp-edged weapon injuries which had not been explained by the prosecution. Discretion exercised by the High Court U/S 426 did not suffer from any illegality or legal infirmity. LEAVE TO APPEAL REFUSED.
2006 MLD 511. Muhammad Tariq V/S The State (Lahore)
S.302(b)/308 PPC. Applicant had submitted that at the time of occurrence, he being 15 years of age, he should have been convicted U/S 308 PPC instead of S.302(b) PPC which was punishable with imprisonment of 14 years and that he had already undergone his sentence of 17/18 years. Contention raised by applicant regarding contradictions in ocular account and others, would be seen at the time of disposal of main appeal. Report of jail authorities showed that applicant/accused had already served a substantial portion of his sentence and his unexpired portion of sentence of 25 years was only 6 years and appeal was not likely to be fixed in the near future. SAuch aspect had entitled applicant for suspension of his sentence. Application granted. SENTENCE SUSPENDED AND BAIL GRANTED.
2006 PCrLJ 853. Muhammad Imran & another V/S The State (Lahore)
S.302/201/202/323/319/34 PPC. Sentence awarded in case was short one (five years). Incident was an accidential one and hearing of appeal could take some time. SENTENCE SUSPENDED.
2006 PCrLJ 1568. Muhammad Arshad V/S The State (Lahore)
S.302(B)/34 PPC. Conflict was found between ocular account and medical evidence. Motive part of story and alleged recovery from accused had not been bvelieved. Evidence on basis of which accused had been convicted and sentenced, needed reappraisal during course of hearing of main appeal. SENTENCE SUSPENDED/bail/BAIL GRANTED.
2003 SCMR 1695. Manzoor @ Tiwana V/S The State (SC.FB)
S.302(b) PPC. Suspension of sentence. Ground urged for suspension of sentence of accused before the High Court in the freshapplication was admittedly available when the previous application was dismissed by the High Court. All the grounds presently urged had already been argued in the previous application. Accused was attributed the role of stabbing the deceased repeatedly and contention regarding his innocence required reappraisal of evidence which could be done at the time of hearing of appeal. LEAVE REFUSID.
PLD 2006 SC 483.
S.302(b) PPC. (1) Power of Appellate Court U/S 426(1) CrPC is not limited and court may, pending disposal of appeal, suspend sentence of a convict in an appropriate case in its discretion for good and sufficient reasons but such power of suspension of sentence and grant of bail is not wider than that U/S 497 CrPC. Unless it is shown that conviction is based on no evidence or being based on inadmissible evidence, is not ultimately sustainable, grant of bail U/S 426 without consideration or ascertaining question of guilt or innocence on merits through appraisal of evidence is not justified as bail either U/S 497 or 426(1) cannot be allowed only on the basis of tentative assessment of evidence. (2) Tentative assessment of evidence. Minor contradictions. Accused was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment by trial court for causing one of the fatal blows to deceased. High Court refused to suspend his sentence. Plea raised by the accused was that there was material contradiction of medical evidence with ocular account which would lead to definite result of his ultimate acquittal. Accused raised the plea that injuries sustained by accused strongly suggested that defence plea was more plausible and nearer to truth, therefore, there was every possibility of his success in appeal. Validity. Accused on the basis of minor contradictions and discrepancies in prosecution evidence, made an attempt to make out a case for suspension of sentence. Grounds taken in support of suspension of sentence and grant of bail could not be appreciated without detailed scrutiny of evidence and such exercise could not be undertaken by Supreme Court at such stage. LEAVE REFUSED. (3) Difference existed between tentative assessment and deep appraisal of evidence and rule was that Appellate Court, could, on the basis of tentative assessment for reasons to be recorded, suspend the sentence and grant bail to a convict but exercise of power to grant bail through suspension of sentence on the basis of deep appraisal of evidence was against the principle governing exercise of power U/S 426(1) CrPC. Appellate court should not go deep into the evidence for the purpose of suspension of sentence by giving reasons which might amount to expressing its views on the merits of the case prejudicing the case of one or the other party in appeal. Accused was granted bail U/S 426(1) CrPC in improper exercise of discretion. Supreme Court converted petition for leave to appeal into appeal and set aside the order passed by High Court, whereby sentence of the accused was suspended. SENTENCE SUSPENDED.
2007 MLD 1066.Muhammad Yasin V/S The State & another (Lahore)
S.302(b) PPC. Suspension of sentence. Fatal injury to injured was attributed to father of petitioner. Petitioner was allegedly armed with a pistol which he did not use during the occurrence. Case being fit for further appreciation of evidence. SENTENCE SUSPENDED/BAIL GRANTED.
2007 SCMR 184. Babar Ali V/S Bashir Ahmad & another
S.302(b)/34 & 429 PPC. S.426 CrPC. Power of Appellate Court U/S 426 CrPC. Accused/Appellant was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment by trial court. High Court, on appeal, while suspending the operation of sentence released accused on bail. Complainant/respondent called in question the order passed by High Court for the reason that power given to Appellate Court U/S 426 was to be sparingly exercised especially in cases where convict had been sentenced to life imprisonment. Accused while supporting order passed by High Court contended that he was found innocent during police investigation and also that his criminal liability under provisions of Penal Code, was yet to be determined. Observation of High Court that case required further inquiry for determination whether offence committed by accused would be covered by S.429 PPC or it would also fall within scope of S.302 PPC at bail stage amounted to giving undue benefit to accused which was likely to adversely affect prosecution case during proceedings of appeal before High Court. While granting bail or suspending sentence awarded to a convict, Court was not required to express opinion as to under what provisions of law, the convict was likely be found guilty or whether his case was to come within scope of a particular section. Evidence produced by prosecution established that accused/appellant armed with Klashnikov had come to the scene of occurrence along with principal accused and fired a burst at deceased and the cow, which conduct and action of accused/appellant was considered by trial court as his sharing common intention with principal accused for causing death of deceased. Finding of Investigating Officer which had not have any binding value, had been disbelieved by trial court. Appellate Court, no doubt, had power to suspend the sentence of accused but the same was to be exercised with due care and caution and satisfactory and cogent reasons were required for suspending the sentence especially in respect of sentence of life imprisonment. No exception circumstances had been highlighted by High Court in its order. Petition converted into appeal and was allowed. ORDER PASSED BY HIGH COURT WAS SET-ASIDE.
NLR 2008 CrLJ 210. Allah Din V/S Special Judge Anti-Terrorism Court Lahore (DB)
S.7(h) & 25(8) Anti-Terrorism Act 1997. The spirit/theme of Anti-Terrorism Act is to provide speedy justice, that is why under S.25(5) the Appellate Court (High Court) is required to decide appeal within seven days and thus debars High Court from releasing convict by suspending his sentence during pendency of his appeal in High Court. It seems that the legislator while making provisions of S.25(8) has ignored the fact that if appeal is not decided within seven days’ period prescribed in S.25(5) and appeal remains pending in High Court for many years as is the normal case due to workload of High Court, what kind of relief should be available to convict if conviction/sentence recorded against him os coram non judice, or sentence is short or he is suffering from ailment which could not be treated in jail. (2) S.25(8) Despite the bar under S.25(8) against release of convict during pendency of his appeal against conviction/sentence recordd against him by Anti-Terrorism Court, High Court is not deprived of authority/jurisdiction under Art.199 to release a convict during pendency of his appeal before High Court by suspending sentence, recorded against convict by Anti-Terrorism Court. High Court may suspend sentence of convict under Art.199 of the Constitution during pendency of his appeal before High Court when satisfied, that (1) case against convict is coram non judice case, (2) there is inordinate delay in disposal of appeal, (3) sentence is short, (4) there is no possibility of hearing of appeal of convict in near future, or (5) convict has developed an ailment which cannot be treated in jail of nature and by keeping him in jail may result in his death. (3) Provisions of S.25(8) constituting a bar for High Court to suspend sentence of convict during pendency 9of appeal against conviction/sentence filed before it are harsh in nature and contrary to principles of natural justice. These harsh provisions of S.25(8) require suitable amendments. SENTENCE SUSPENDED.
PLD 2008 Lahore 306. Jamshed Ali V/S The State
S.302(b)/34 PPC. Suspension of sentence. No overt act was attributed to accused in the FIR and his presence on the spot at the time of occurrence was only shown. Although accused was allegedly armed with a sun, yet neither the same was used by him during the incident nor was it recovered during investigation. Deceased was done to death at the dead of the night and the FIR was lodged with a delay of four and a half hours. No chance of early hearing of appeal of accused was in sight. Accused being an old man of 71 years was an infirm person and the principles enshrined under S.497 could be considered while deciding an application under S.426 CrPC. (2) S.426, 496 & 497 CrPC. Powers conferred under S.426 CrPC are not controlled by the provisions of S.496 & 497 CrPC but the principles enshrined therein can be taken into consideration while deciding applications under S.426 CrPC. SENTENCE SUSPENDED.
PLD 1995 Karachi 209 Shah Hussain V/S The State
S.320 PPC. S.426 CrPC. Suspension of sentence. Accused, a Mini Bus driver, in a case of fatal accident had been convicted and sentenced U/S 320 PPC and his appeal against his conviction and sentence had been admitted. Offence being bailable accused after admission of his appeal was entitled to be released on bail as a matter of right. SENT. SUSPENDED/BAIL GRANTED.
2006 PCrLJ 1534. Iftikhar Hussain V/S The State (Lahore)
S.320/337-G PPC. Sentence recorded against accused was short and substantial part thereof had already been undergone by accused and also it was not certain as to when criminal revision by accused would be taken up for hearing. SENTENCE SUSPENDED/BAIL GRANTED.
2005 MLD 1812. Muhammad Anwar V/S The State (Lahore DB)
S.324 PPC. Accused was attributed firing in the air and injured had not attributed the injury to accused. Case of accused was fit for consideration as it would be too harsh to keep accused in death cell till hearing of appeal which was likely to take a long time. SENTENCE SUSPENDED AND BAIL GRANTED
2005 MLD 1934. Zahid Hussain V/S The State (Lahore)
S.324/337-D PPC. Sentence awarded to accused was short (5 years) and hearing of appeal could take some time. SENTENCE SUSPENDED AND BAIL GRANTED.
PLD 2008 Lahore (DB) 74.Allah Din & others V/S Special Judge ATC Lahore
S.324/34 & 353/34 PPC. Both the accused (brothers) were alleged to have made firing at the police party but admittedly none of the police officials had secured any injury during the occurrence. Sentence of both the accused was short i.e. maximum three years major portion of which had already been undergone by them. Hearing of appeals of the accused in near future was not possible. SENTENCE SUSPENDED.
2002 MLD 1040. Muhammad Mansha & another V/S The State (Lahore)
S.337-L(2) & 149 PPC. Suspension of sentence pending appeal. Sentences of imprisonment passed against accused were relatively short and their right of appeal was likely to be frustrated in case they would undergo a substantial part of their sentences of imprisonment before their appeal could be heard by court. Both accused had already spent about six months in jail after their conviction by trial court and about a year prior to their conviction. SENT.SUSPENDED/BAIL GRANTED.
NLR 2004 SD 1171. Muhammad Ali V/S The State (Lahore)
S.337A(2)337F(1)337L(2)/337H(2)/440/148/149 PPC. S.426 CrPC. Convict undergoing sentence of life imprisonment would be entitled to suspension of his sentence under the rule of consistency when sentence of life imprisonment awarded to his co-convict has already been suspended and such order of suspension has been upheld by Supreme Court. SENTENCE SUSPENDED.
2008 PCrLJ 438. Ghulam Muhammad & 2 Others V/S The State (Lahore)
S.337-A(i)/337-A(iv)/427/341/147/149 PPC. S.426 CrPC. Sentences awarded to the petitioners were short and before the criminal revision was fixed for final hearing, it was quite possible that the petitioners could have served their entire sentence. Petitioner for suspension of sentence was accepted and the sentence of the petitioners was suspended and they were admitted to bail. SENTENCE SUSPENDED.
PLJ 2008 Lahore-DB 565. Allah Din V/S Special Judge Anti-Terrorism Court
S.6 & 7 Anti-Terrorism Act 1997. S.341/355/386/365 PPC. Petitioners had already served out more than one and half year of their sentence. Possibility of hearing of appeal in the near future was not within sight. BAIL GRANTED.
NLR 2004 SD 579. Husnain Raza @ Jani V/S The State (FSC)
S.377 PPC. Sentence of two and half years imposed on convicts by trial court after their conviction for sodomy U/S 377 suspended by FSC on ground that convicts had already undergone substantial portions of their sentence. SENTENCE SUSPENDED.
PD 2008 Lahore (DB) 74. Allah Din & Others V/S Special Judge Anti-Terrorism Court
S.386/34, 355/34 & 341 PPC. Trial Court vide the impugned judgment had already acquitted the accused from the charge under S.365-A. Accused had almost undergone the sentences of imprisonment for the offences under S.355 & 341 PPC. Prima facie, evidence on record was not sufficient to attract the provisions of S.386 PPC. Accused had already served out more than one and a half years of their sentence of imprisonment and possibility of hearing of their appeal in the near future was not within sight. SENTENCE SUSPENDED.
PLD 2003 Karachi 398. Muhammad Usman Farooqui V/S The State (DB)
S. 409/109 PPC. S.382-B/397/426/561-A CrPC. Application for suspension of sentence. Reference to Accountability Court. Accused was tried in three references by Accountability court and in first two references was awarded sentence to suffer RI for seven years with fine in each reference while in third reference he was con victed and awarded sentence to suffer RI for twelves years and fine.Accused was arrested on 5-9-1996 and benefit of S.382-B had separately been extended to the accused in all the three cases. Report received from jail authorities showed that actual period spent in jail by the accused in each case was 6 years, 5 months and 10 days. Even if substantive sentence awarded to the accused in first two references were allowed to run consecutively in terms of S.397 CrPC then as per report of jail authorities, the accused already not only had served substantive sentences awarded to him, but over and above he had still more than ten years period oto his credit which could be deducted from the substantive sentence of twelves years awarded to him in third reference. If only the remission earned by the accused after his first conviction or marginal portion of total remission earned by the accused was to be taken into consideration, even then it could be evident that the accused had already served substantive sentence of seven years' RI. in each case. Besides, by virtue of S.32(b) of the NAB Ordinance 1999 specific period of 30 days had been prescribed for disposal of appeals filed by the accused but for no fault of the accused said appeals were still pending for disposal for almost the past two years. For said delay the accused could not be penalized and incarcerated for an indefinite period. Pending appeals, sentences of imprisonment and fine awarded to the accused, were suspended. SENTENCE SUSPENDED.
2003 PCrLJ 1714. Ghulam Sarwar V/S The) State (Lahore)
S.420/468/471 PPC. S.5(2) Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947.S.426 & 497 CrPC. Application for suspension of sentence. Accused was convicted U/S 471 PPC and was sentenced to two years’ RI with fine. Said offence according to Second Schedule to CrPC was bailable. Same principles would govern question of suspension or otherwise of the sentence as were relevant for grant of bail to the accused U/S 497 CrPC. Case for suspension of sentence having been made out, application of accused was accepted and sentence of accused was suspended pending disposal of his appeal and he was directed to be released on bail. SENTENCE SUSPENDED/BAIL GRANTED.
NLR 2004 SD 1137. Malik Nazir Ahmad & another V/S The State (Bahawalpur)
S.468 PPC. S.426 CrPC. Sentence of one year’s R.I. imposed by trial court after conviction of accused for offences U/S 420/468/471 PPC r/w/ S.5(2) Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 suspended by High Court by accepting application of convicts on ground that sentence was short and their appeal against conviction/sentence pending in High Court was not likely to be heard in near future. SENTENCE SUSPENDED.
PLJ 2008 SC 233. Makhdoom Javed Hashmi V/S The State
S.124-A, 468, 469, 471, 500, 505(a), 131 and 109 PPC. Accused who has already undergone almost half of his sentence may seek suspension of sentence in the interest of justice. If ultimately the appeal of accused is dismissed by the appellate court, provisions of S.426(3) CrPC would come in operation and the period of suspension of sentence shall find excluded and he would have to undergo the sentence awarded to accused by Court. BAIL GRANTED.
2001 MLD 1251. Muzaffar Ali V/S The State (Lahore DB).
S.9(c) Control of Narcotics Sub.Act 1997. S.426 CrPC. Suspension of sentence, pending appeal, against convition, had been sought on the ground that nothing was recovered from the accused during the investigation of the case; that reliable and trustworthy evidence produced by the accused had been ignored by the trial court without any plausible reason and that statutory period for the disposal of appeal had expired and the accused had earned the right of bail. Huge quantity of narcotics was recovered from the accused. Grounds agitated by the accused for suspension of sentence, required deeper appreciation which was not appropriate/permissible at such stage. SENTENCE NOT SUSPENDED
NLR 2003 CrLJ 598. Mst. Manan @ Nazir Mai V/S The State (Lahore DB)
S.9(b) Cont. of Nar. Sub. Act 1997. 426 & 497 CrPC. Same principles which govern the grant or otherwise of bail U/S 497 CrPC would be applicable to the suspension of sentence U//S 426. Convict whose husband has been murdered and has five children to look after would be entitled to suspension of sentence awarded to her U/S 9(b) of Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997. SENTENCE SUSPENDED.
2006 PCrLJ 993. Muneer Ahmed & 2 Others V/S The State (Karachi DB)
S.9(b) Cont. of Nar. Sub. Act 1997. Sentence was short (three years) and accused had already remained behind the bars for over two months while appeal was not likely to be heard and decided in near future. State Counsel had no objection to the suspension of sentence. SENT, SUSPENDED/BAIL GRANTED.
2008 PCrLJ 674. Fayyaz Masih V/S The State (Lahore DB)
S.9(b) Control of Narcotics Substances Act, 1997. Allegation against accused was that 400 grams of charas was recovered from him. Accused, who was convicted and sentenced for six months, had served out imprisonment for one month and 16 datys. Accused had already been given the benefit of S.382-B CrPC. Sentence awarded to accused being short, he was enlarged on bail. BAIL GRANTED
PLJ 2008 SC 322. Khalid Mehmood Butt & another V/S The State
S.9(C ) control of Narcotic Substances Act 1997. Recovery of small amount of narcotics from petitioners. Two conflicting reports relating to material in question. Petitioners were in jail since 21.3.2001. No likelihood of petitioner’s appeal being heard in near future. Petitioners have made out a case for suspension of their sentences. BAIL GRANTED.
PLD 2009 Lahore (DB) 632. Mubarak Ali V/S The State
S.426 CrPC. S.9 (c ) CNS Act 1997. Suspension of sentence -- Practice and procedure -- Scope --- Appellate court while deciding petition for suspension of sentence would not undertake reappraisal of entire evidence but would confine its consideration to the infirmities in the judgment of trial court with reference to the grounds urged in the memo of appeal, which would show that conviction was not sustainable in law, and on reaching such conclusion Appellate Court can suspend sentence. While suspending sentence Appellate Court can also consider the fact that the sentence awarded was short and the appeal was not likely to be disposed of soon. (2) Section 426(1) CrPC is not divided into categories or classes as S.497(1) CrPC. There is no concept of offences falling in probibitory clause in S.426 CrPC as provided in S.497. Court while considering a bail application under S.497 is conscious of peresumption of innocence in favour of accused, whereas no such presumption exists in favour of a convict having been found guilty by a competent court. Under S.497(1) bail is generally granted as a rule in cases not falling within the prohibitory clause and refusal is an exception, whereas no such demarcation is made in S.426(1). Court in both sections has discretion but language of the same shows that discretion under section 497(1) is more liberal and lenient than under S.426(1). Leniency becomes more stringent in cases where a convict seeks suspension of his sentence in narcotic cases in view of effect of S.51 & 47 of the CNS Act 1997 or S.497 read with S.426 CrPC. PETITION DISMISSED.
2003 SCMR 22.Khan Muhammad Mahar V/S The State (SC.DB)
S.10 NAB Ordinance 1999. Accused according to jail authorities had already undergone substantive sentence of his imprisonment and the decision of his appeal was not likely to take place in near future. SENTENCE SUSPENDED.
2006 SCMR 1225. Peer Mukarram-Ul-Haq V/S National Accountability Bureau (SC.DB)
S.9 NAB Ordinance 1999. S.496, 497 & 426 CrPC. Bail on medical ground. Petitioner had undergone a substantive portion of sentence and the medical certificates were indicative of the ailment which appeared to be somewhat serious. Medical opinion furnished by Medical specialist had recommended shifting of petitioner to some care health facility where a team of Specialists in Diabetes, Neuro-physicians and Cardiologist were available. Petitioner, during the recent past, was hospitalized and remained under treatment in the department of Urology. Held, requisite medical facilities, modern techniques, uptodate operation skill and know-how were not available in the District Headquarter Hospitals which aspect of the matter could not be ignored. Grant of bail and suspension of sentence though was a discretionary matter but such discretion should be exercised in accordance with substantive provisions of law and the principles settled by the Supreme Court. Suspension of sentence might be refused but in such an eventuality it would be mandatory for the High Court to assign reasoning which could not be done by disposing of the constitutional petition preferred by the petitioner and such order of the High Court could not be equated to that of a "firm" or :well-reason" order. Where the High Court had not assigned any reasoning for disposal of the constitutional petition, such order of the High Court could not be termed as speaking order and was also not in consonance with the law laid down by the Supreme Court. Supreme Court converted the petition into appeal and accepted the same and petitioner was directed to be released on bail on furnishing surety of the specified amount. Petitioner was directed to surrender his passport in the office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court and his name was directed to be p0laced on exit list till disposal of his appeal penbding before the High Court. (2) S.426/496/497 CrPC. Power conferred U/S 426 CrPC is not controlled by the provisions of S.496 and 497 CrPC but the principles enuniciated therein can be taken into consideration while granting or refusing bail. BAIL GRANTED.
PLD 2009 SC 388. Anwar-Ul-Haq V/S National Accountability Bureau
S.426 CrPC. S.10(a) NAB Ordinance 1999. Art.185(3) of Constitution. Accused had been awarded a sentence of ten years' R.I. with benefit of S.382-B CrPC. After counting the remissions towards the sentence of accused he was found to have already undergone major portion of his sentence. When appeal against the conviction of accused keeps on pending for a long period without his fault, his sentence has to be suspended. Petition for leave to appeal was converted into appeal and allowed and sentence of accused was suspended. SENTENCE SUSPENDED.
2007 MLD 1278. Anwar & another V/S The State (Karachi)
Accused remained on bail during trial and allegation against him was of aerial firing. Sentence of accused was suspended with the consent of State counsel. Co-accused was suffering from TB and was bleeding from mouth with cough, which was not only serious for him, but also dangerous for other inmates of the jail. Sentence of co-accused was also suspended. SENTENCE SUSPENDED/BAIL GRANTED.
NLR 2007 CrLJ 488.Babar Ali V/S Bashir Ahmad & another (SC)
S.426 CrPC. It is settled law that in granting bail or suspending sentence awarded to a convict, the Court is not required to express as to under what provision of law the convict would be likely to be found guilty or whether case against convict does not come within scope of particular section of PPC. High Court would not be justified in suspending life imprisonment with observation that case required further inquiry for determination whether offence committed by convict would be covered by S.429 PPC or it would also fall U/S 302 PPC. BAIL BOND CANCELLED.
PLD 2008 Lahore (DB) 74.Allah Din & Others V/S Special Judge Anti-Terrorism Court
S.7(h) Anti-Terrorism Act 1997. Accused and his co-accused had allegedly quarrlled with their opposite party in the High Court premises and given kicks and fist blows to them. FIR was absolutely silent about use of fire arms during the occurrence, nor the occurrence had taken place at any place of worship. Provisions of S.7(h) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, therefore, were not attracted in the circumstances of the case, which called for reappraisal of evidence. (2) S.25(8) Anti-Terrorism Act 1997. Despite the bar under S.25(8), High Court can release a convict on bail during the pendency of his appeal. Jealously guarding its authority qua the grant of relief to an aggrieved/deserving person by the court of competent jurisdiction is very natural. Spirit/Theme of the 1997 Act is to provide speedy justice that is why under S.25(5) the Appellate Tribunal is required to decide the appeal within seven days and thus debarring the Appellate Authority from releasing the convict on bail during the pendency of his appeal was understandable, but it seems that the Legislature while making the said provisions of law has ignored that if the appeal is not decided within the said period and remained pending for many years due to heavy workload of the court, then what kind of relief is available to the convict if otherwise his case is that of corum-non-judice, or short sentence or when the convict is suffering from ailment which could not be treated in the jail hospital. Inordinate delay in prosecution of criminal case amounts to abuse of process of law/court and in such like situation accused/convict earns the right for the grant of bail. SENTENCE SUSPENDED/BAIL GRANTED.
2008 PCrLJ 671. Muhammad Iqbal V/S The State (FSC)
S.10 Zina Ordinance. Co-accused had been acquitted, while accused alone had been convicted U/S 10(3) on the same set of evidence. Conviction of accused and acquittal of co-accused, in circumstances, seemed to be self-contradictory. Application filed by accused for suspension of sentence, was allowed. SENTENCE SUSPENDED.
2008 SCMR 1204. Liaquat Ali V/S Mst. Khalida Parveen & Others (SC Shariat Appellate Jurisdiction)
S.11 Offences of Qazf (E.H.) Ord. 1979. S.426 CrPC. Request for suspension of sentence on the part of those who had uttered slander about ladies was mockery. Holy Quran takes the most serious notice of such people and says: “Flog them with eighty stripes, And reject their evidence (Shahadah). Ever after: for such men are wicked transgressors” (Sura Al-Noor:4)—Indeed Holy Quran regards life devoid of morality, meaningless. Divine Law has to be followed in social affairs sincerely. No ground was made out for suspension of sentence. LEAVE TO APPEAL REFUSED
2009 PCrLJ 257. Atta Ullah @ Hasnain @ Hassan V/S The State (Lahore DB)
S.426(2-B)CrPC. S.25(8) ATC Act 1997. (2) S.426(2-B) CrPC. S.13(a)(c )) & 13(b) Arms Ord. S. 4 & 5 Explosive Substance Act 1884, S.7 Surrender of Illicit Arms Ord.1991. Discretion had been left with the court to suspend the sentence of a convict who had been granted leave to appeal by the Supremem Court “if it would think fit according to the facts and circumstances of the case”. Mere fact that petitioner had been granted leave to appeal, would not, ipso facto, give him right to seek the suspension of sentenceHuge quangtity of illicit arms in the shape of a Kalashinkov, 3 magazines, 56 bullets and 2 hand-grenades, were recovered from the petitioner; and two courts had concurrently found him guilty, of the said offence and at that stage, it could not be said that such huge quantity was planted by the police to implicate the petitioner falsely. No special circumstances had been urged for suspension of sentence. Since the matter was pending before the Supreme Court, any more comments could prejudice the case of the petitioner before the apex Court. PETITION DISMISSE